People of Michigan v. Donvelle Tyrone Nichols
329240
| Mich. Ct. App. | Dec 22, 2016Background
- Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver <50 grams of cocaine and was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender to 2–20 years’ imprisonment.
- Trial court relied on three prior felonies to reach fourth-habitual status: one carrying a concealed weapon conviction and two second-or-subsequent convictions for possession of marijuana under the Public Health Code.
- Under MCL 333.7403(2)(d) possession of marijuana is designated a misdemeanor, but MCL 333.7413(2) doubles the authorized punishment for second/subsequent controlled-substance offenses (up to 2 years’ imprisonment).
- The question was whether those second/subsequent marijuana convictions qualify as "felonies" for habitual-offender purposes under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
- Defendant also argued double enhancement occurred, that sentence enhancement should trigger jury/notice protections, and that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether second/subsequent marijuana convictions count as felonies for habitual-offender enhancement | Prior convictions qualify as felonies because under MCL 761.1(g) a felony is any penal violation punishable by >1 year, and MCL 333.7413(2) permits up to 2 years for repeat offenders | Those convictions are misdemeanors under the Public Health Code and thus cannot support habitual-offender enhancement | Held: They qualify as felonies for Code of Criminal Procedure purposes; trial court properly used them to enhance sentence (Smith controlling) |
| Whether sentencing here amounted to impermissible double enhancement | Prosecutor and court did not apply both the repeat-drug enhancement and habitual-offender enhancement to the same sentence | Defendant argued the sentence was doubly enhanced by both statutory schemes | Held: No double enhancement; defendant was only sentenced under habitual-offender statute, so Fetterley does not apply |
| Whether repeat-offender penalty alters substantive offense triggering jury/right-to-notice protections | Repeat penalty is only an increased punishment, not a separate offense element requiring jury/trial notice | Defendant argued doubling changes the nature of the crime and demands jury/notice protections | Held: Enhancement provision does not create a new offense and does not entitle defendant to jury or separate charging of priors (Eason) |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to using those priors as felonies | Counsel’s decision not to raise a meritless objection was reasonable; no prejudice shown | Defendant argued counsel should have objected and advised differently regarding felony status of priors | Held: No ineffective assistance; objection would have been meritless so counsel’s performance was not deficient |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Smith, 423 Mich 427 (1985) (Code of Criminal Procedure definition of "felony" governs habitual-offender application)
- People v Wyrick, 474 Mich 947 (2005) (Public Health Code classification of marijuana possession discussed)
- People v Allen, 499 Mich 307 (2016) (habitual-offender statutory framework)
- People v Eason, 435 Mich 228 (1990) (repeat-drug penalty is an increased punishment, not a new substantive offense requiring jury)
- People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511 (1998) (double enhancement doctrine)