People of Michigan v. Dontez Marc Tillman, 329312

In August 2008, a group of teenagers brutally beat 61‑year‑old Wilford “Frenchie” Hamilton; defendant Tillman was 14 at the time and convicted of first‑degree felony murder.
On initial appeal this Court affirmed the conviction but vacated the mandatory life‑without‑parole sentence under Miller v. Alabama because Tillman was a juvenile when the crime occurred.
The prosecutor sought resentencing under Michigan’s post‑Miller statute, MCL 769.25, which permits either life without parole or a term‑of‑years (minimum 25–40, maximum at least 60) for juvenile homicide offenders.
The parties ultimately agreed in the resentencing proceeding to a term‑of‑years sentence of 32½ to 60 years; Tillman admitted guilt and apologized at resentencing.
On appeal, Tillman challenged the resentencing on ex post facto, jury‑trial, and Eighth Amendment grounds; the Court affirmed, holding issues waived/without standing and that a judge (not jury) decides sentencing under MCL 769.25.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Tillman)	Held
Waiver of challenge to resentencing under MCL 769.25	Defendant agreed to term‑of‑years sentence; therefore no error to raise	Resentencing under MCL 769.25 violates ex post facto principles	Waived: defendant requested and accepted the agreed sentence, extinguishing appellate review
Right to jury at resentencing	Judge should decide sentencing under statute; no Sixth Amendment right to jury for MCL 769.25 findings	Relies on People v. Skinner: juveniles facing LWOP must have jury determine sentencing facts	No error: precedent in Hyatt (conflict panel) controls—judge, not jury, determines sentencing under MCL 769.25
Eighth Amendment challenge to exposure to LWOP for 14‑year‑old	State may legislatively authorize LWOP for juveniles in appropriate cases; Miller does not categorically bar LWOP	It is unconstitutional to expose a 14‑year‑old to potential life without parole	Not reached on merits: defendant lacks standing because he received a term‑of‑years sentence, not LWOP; also Miller/Montgomery permit discretionary LWOP in appropriate cases
Standing to challenge LWOP exposure	N/A	Defendant claims unconstitutional to subject 14‑year‑olds to LWOP	Lacks standing—no injury in fact because sentence imposed was term of years

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller rulings apply retroactively and states may impose discretionary LWOP in appropriate cases)
People v. Vaughn, 491 Mich. 642 (2012) (waiver is intentional relinquishment of a known right; waived rights extinguish appellate review)
People v. Green, 228 Mich. App. 684 (1998) (a defendant may not assign error on appeal to a decision his counsel approved)
People v. Armistead, 295 Mich. App. 32 (2011) (standard of review for unpreserved constitutional issues)
People v. Rocha, 110 Mich. App. 1 (1981) (standing requires an injury in fact to be aggrieved by the challenged act)