People of Michigan v. Daniel Ray Bean
159384
| Mich. | Jul 9, 2021Background
- Defendant Daniel Ray Bean was originally charged with third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III) for sexual penetration of a 15-year-old; the prosecutor sought to amend to first-degree CSC (CSC-I) on two alternate theories: (a) the penetration occurred under circumstances involving commission of “any other felony” (allegedly second-degree child abuse), and (b) the victim and defendant were related by affinity.
- The district court bound the defendant over on CSC-I under both theories; the circuit court quashed CSC-I as to the affinity theory but denied the motion as to the other-felony theory.
- The Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished per curiam opinion, holding second-degree child abuse could not serve as the “other felony” when the same act (the sexual penetration) constituted both offenses.
- The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave limited to whether second-degree child abuse (MCL 750.136b(3)(b)) can serve as an adequate predicate “other felony” for CSC-I under MCL 750.520b(1)(c) when the same act supports both charges.
- On July 9, 2021, the Supreme Court vacated its earlier order and denied the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal; Justice Clement (joined by Justice Zahra) dissented, arguing the child-abuse felony is a valid predicate even when based on the same act.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether second-degree child abuse qualifies as “any other felony” under MCL 750.520b(1)(c) when the same sexual penetration constitutes both offenses | Second-degree child abuse is a felony distinct from CSC and thus fits the plain meaning of “any other felony,” so CSC-III may be elevated to CSC-I | The statutory phrase requires a separate underlying felonious act; the same act cannot serve as both the sexual-penetration offense and the “other felony” | Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal (no majority ruling). Dissent (Clement) would have reversed the COA and held child abuse qualifies as “any other felony.” |
| Whether the statute requires a separate-act or direct interrelationship between the felony and the sexual penetration | No separate-act requirement appears in the statute; the text requires only that penetration occur "under circumstances involving the commission of any other felony" | Court of Appeals and defense argued precedent (Waltonen) and rationale require a separate felonious act or direct interrelationship beyond the penetration itself | Supreme Court denied review; dissent rejected a separate-act requirement and read the statute according to its plain language. |
| Whether interpreting child abuse as “any other felony” would improperly elevate all CSC-III charges to CSC-I | Prosecutor: not every CSC-III would be elevated because many CSC-III permutations (e.g., adult victims, lack of custodial relationship) cannot also be child abuse felonies | Defense: such an interpretation would automatically convert most CSC-III to CSC-I, contrary to legislative intent | Supreme Court denied review; dissent explained statutory definitions prevent automatic elevation in many CSC-III scenarios. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Rea, 500 Mich 422 (2017) (statutory interpretation; use of dictionaries to ascertain plain meaning)
- People v Jones, 144 Mich App 1 (1985) (legislative purpose for elevating certain sexual offenses when a coexistent felony increases risks to the victim)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 US 299 (1932) (same-elements test for determining whether offenses are the same)
- People v Waltonen, 272 Mich App 678 (2006) (interpreting “under circumstances involving” to require a direct interrelationship between the felony and the penetration)
- People v Ream, 481 Mich 223 (2008) (adoption of Blockburger same-elements analysis)