935 N.W.2d 59
Mich. Ct. App.2019Background
- Officer Britton stopped Collin Stricklin for speeding, conducted OWI investigation, arrested him, and requested an evidentiary chemical test (blood). He read the standard DI-177 implied-consent form advising that refusal would suspend Stricklin’s license and add six points.
- Stricklin consented to the blood draw. He later moved to suppress the blood evidence, arguing his consent was involuntary because he feared the civil sanctions (license suspension and points) would harm his livelihood (he drove for work and was in a fire academy).
- At the district-court evidentiary hearing, the officer testified Stricklin was cooperative, understood the rights, and that the decision to seek blood (rather than breath) was the officer’s personal preference; no exigent circumstances were found.
- The district court suppressed the blood evidence, concluding a warrant was required; the circuit court affirmed, finding consent involuntary because of Stricklin’s fear of economic consequences from license suspension.
- The prosecution appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed: it held the implied-consent sanctions did not render consent per se involuntary and, on the limited record, Stricklin’s express consent was voluntary under the totality of circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether consent to a warrantless blood draw was voluntary | Consent was voluntary; implied-consent sanctions are civil and do not automatically invalidate consent | Consent was involuntary because threat of license suspension and points coerced his choice due to economic impact | Held: Consent was voluntary under the totality of circumstances; sanctions alone did not render consent coerced |
| Whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless blood draw | N/A (prosecution conceded no exigency) | Officer’s preference for blood created no exigency; warrant required absent exigency | Held: No exigent circumstances; but consent exception justified the search |
| Whether district/circuit courts properly suppressed evidence under the Fourth Amendment | Suppression was erroneous because valid consent permits warrantless search | Suppression appropriate because consent was coerced by implied-consent penalties | Held: Suppression reversed; exclusionary rule inapplicable given voluntary consent |
| Whether a defendant’s awareness of right to refuse is required for valid consent | N/A | Lack of explicit voluntariness due to coercion despite knowing rights | Held: Knowledge of right to refuse is one factor but not required; here defendant understood choices and voluntarily consented |
Key Cases Cited
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (blood draws are searches; warrant required unless exception such as voluntariness or exigency applies)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (voluntariness of consent governed by totality of circumstances; consent must not be coerced)
- People v. Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich. 278 (1999) (Michigan precedent applying voluntariness analysis to chemical testing consent)
- People v. Perlos, 436 Mich. 305 (1990) (recognizing strong public interest in implied-consent laws)
- People v. Barbarich (On Remand), 291 Mich. App. 468 (2011) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
- People v. Woodard, 321 Mich. App. 377 (2017) (Fourth Amendment application to uncontested facts entitled to less deference; de novo review)
- People v. Galloway, 259 Mich. App. 634 (2003) (consent requires being unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given)
- People v. Chowdhury, 285 Mich. App. 509 (2009) (prosecution bears burden to prove consent was voluntary)