People of Michigan v. Brian David MacKsey
333846
| Mich. Ct. App. | Dec 5, 2017Background
- Defendant Brian Macksey was convicted by a jury of 1st-degree CSC and two counts of 2nd-degree CSC for sexual assaults on his girlfriend’s daughter; sentences ran concurrently (25–45 years for 1st-degree; 5–15 for each 2nd-degree).
- The victim delayed reporting the alleged assaults for about two years; she testified she was told not to tell, feared defendant, feared harm to her family, and was unsure whether defendant had left the state.
- Defense planned to introduce evidence that the victim had previously been sexually assaulted by an older boy on a school bus and had reported that prior assault promptly.
- Prosecution objected; trial court excluded the prior-incident evidence on relevance grounds (not under the rape-shield statute) after reserving ruling pending expert testimony.
- Prosecution’s expert testified that delayed disclosure by child victims is common; defense did not renew the admissibility motion after the expert’s testimony.
- On appeal, the court held the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the prior-report evidence as relevant, but the error was harmless and the conviction was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of prior-report evidence | Evidence should be excluded (prosecution previously argued rape‑shield) | Evidence was relevant to show victim knew how to report and to rebut delayed-disclosure explanation | Exclusion was an abuse of discretion; the evidence was relevant and probative but should have been limited in details |
| Constitutional right to present a defense | State: exclusion was proper | Exclusion violated due process and right to present a defense | Court agreed there was a deprivation in excluding relevant evidence but evaluated prejudice |
| Harmless-error analysis | Error was prejudicial | Admission would have helped show prompt reporting in prior incident, undermining delayed-disclosure explanation | Error was harmless; other testimony showed victim knew how to report and inculpatory evidence made different result unlikely |
| Ineffective assistance for not renewing motion | State: counsel’s strategy was reasonable | Counsel’s failure to renew after expert testimony was objectively unreasonable | Counsel was deficient, but defendant failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome; no relief granted |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Aldrich, 246 Mich. App. 101 (2001) (general admissibility principle: relevant evidence admissible)
- People v. Powell, 303 Mich. App. 271 (2013) (relevance as helpfulness on material points)
- People v. Brooks, 453 Mich. 511 (1996) (materiality and probative force framework)
- People v. Lukity, 460 Mich. 484 (1999) (harmless-error standard for nonconstitutional and constitutional errors)
- People v. Rodriguez, 463 Mich. 466 (2000) (harmless-error analysis and verdict reliability)
- People v. Unger, 278 Mich. App. 210 (2008) (abuse of discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
- People v. Yost, 278 Mich. App. 341 (2008) (definition of abuse of discretion)
- People v. Steele, 283 Mich. App. 472 (2009) (de novo review for deprivation of right to present a defense)
- People v. Schrauben, 314 Mich. App. 181 (2016) (Strickland-style prejudice standard for ineffective assistance)
