People of Michigan v. Brian Paul Timko
328374
| Mich. Ct. App. | Nov 22, 2016Background
- Appellant John W. Ujlaky was appointed to represent a defendant in post-conviction proceedings and submitted a MAACS voucher seeking $3,012 in fees (50.2 hours at $60/hr) and $181.15 in expenses.
- On the voucher he checked the box for a “motion for extraordinary fees” and attached a billing record but did not file a separate formal motion explaining why fees exceeded the county cap.
- The trial court awarded $700 in fees (county cap for plea cases) and $181.15 in expenses and denied a reconsideration motion seeking the remaining $2,312.
- Ujlaky argued the trial court improperly applied the fee schedule without evaluating reasonableness, and raised constitutional claims under the Fifth (takings) and Sixth (effective assistance) Amendments.
- The Court of Appeals found the situation analogous to In re Ujlaky (498 Mich 890) where the Supreme Court remanded because the trial court applied a fee cap without addressing reasonableness, and therefore remanded for the trial court to either award the requested fees or articulate on the record why they are not reasonable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court properly limited appointed counsel to county fee cap without addressing reasonableness | County fee schedule governs and caps compensation | Ujlaky: trial court must assess whether requested fees are reasonable and may approve excess under county policy | Reversed and remanded: trial court must either award requested fees or explain on record why they are unreasonable |
| Whether counsel’s checkbox and billing statement sufficed as a request for extraordinary fees | Fee cap applied despite submission form | Ujlaky: attached billing and voucher box should invoke extraordinary-fee process | Court treated submission as comparable to prior Supreme Court precedent and remanded for reasonableness determination |
| Whether reducing fees to cap constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking | County payment policy is binding; no taking | Ujlaky: attorney’s services are property and cap without justification is a taking | Rejected: compensation not yet determined; no seizure of a vested contractual right |
| Whether low payment violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel | No clear Sixth Amendment violation from payment level | Ujlaky: economic disincentive undermines effective assistance | Rejected: low pay alone does not establish denial of effective assistance per Michigan precedent |
Key Cases Cited
- Churchman v. Rickerson, 240 Mich. App. 223 (trial-court reconsideration reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- In re Attorney Fees of Mullkoff, 176 Mich. App. 82 (court reviews reasonableness of appointed counsel fees for abuse of discretion)
- People v. Waclawski, 286 Mich. App. 634 (abuse-of-discretion defined)
- In re Ujlaky, 498 Mich. 890 (Supreme Court remanded where trial court applied county fee cap without addressing reasonableness of services)
- In re Attorney Fees of Jamnik, 176 Mich. App. 827 (factors for determining reasonable appointed counsel fees)
- In re Meizlish, 387 Mich. 228 (payment level does not alone deny effective assistance of counsel)
- Wayne Co. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Wayne Co. Airport Auth., 253 Mich. App. 144 (takings analysis: government seizure of property requires just compensation)