People in re C.W.B., Jr
2017 COA 68
| Colo. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Infant C.W.B., Jr. (10 weeks) was adjudicated dependent/neglected after hospital findings of a broken femur and skull fracture; placed with foster parents J.S. and A.S. (Intervenors).
- Father’s parental rights were later terminated after criminal convictions; mother (M.A.S.) worked a treatment plan and made substantial progress.
- Intervenors moved to intervene as of right under § 19-3-507(5)(a); GAL filed a motion to terminate mother’s parental rights; Intervenors participated fully and opposed reunification.
- After a two-day hearing the juvenile court denied the GAL’s motion, finding mother substantially complied with her plan and was not unfit; the Department did not support termination.
- Intervenors appealed the denial; the Court of Appeals addressed standing and the merits, ultimately affirming the denial. Judge Harris dissented, arguing the Intervenors lacked standing to appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to appeal by foster parents | §19-3-507(5)(a) gives foster parents an unconditional right to intervene and to advocate for the child’s best interests, including appellate review | Intervenors lack a legally protected interest; statute grants participation rights but not third-party appellate standing; only aggrieved parties may appeal | Majority: Intervenors have standing to appeal under §19-3-507(5)(a). Dissent: they do not. Court proceeds on merits and affirms. |
| Whether court failed to give primary consideration to child’s needs | Intervenors say court ignored expert evidence about harm from removing child from foster parents and should have prioritized child’s current needs | Trial court considered child’s needs alongside parental fitness and found mother could meet the child’s needs; primary consideration does not supersede fitness analysis | Court: No abuse of discretion; correct legal standard applied—child’s needs and parental fitness are intertwined. |
| Conflict with prior orders reducing mother’s visitation | Intervenors contend the court’s earlier visitation limits (due to child stress) make denial of termination inconsistent and erroneous | Trial court balanced changed facts and maternal progress; Intervenors didn’t identify specific reversible abuse of discretion | Court: Argument inadequately developed and rejected to extent duplicative of primary-consideration claim. |
| Expedited permanency planning (§19-3-703) | Intervenors contend the Department should have been required to follow expedited permanency procedures for child under six | Trial court found delaying permanency to allow mother more time to complete her plan advanced reunification, which qualifies as a permanent home under §19-3-703 | Court: No error; court’s findings show good cause to delay permanency. |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (foster parents lack constitutionally protected liberty interest in their foster-child relationship)
- Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987) (intervenors may appeal final judgments that affect them)
- Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986) (party status in trial court does not automatically confer appellate standing)
- Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (standing must exist at each stage, including appeal; appellant must have a direct stake)
- Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851 (Colo. 2004) (Colorado test for standing: injury in fact to legally protected interest)
- People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1981) (parental relationship should not be terminated simply because child’s condition might improve in another home)
- K.D. v. People, 139 P.3d 695 (Colo. 2006) (determination of parental unfitness is intertwined with child’s best interests)