People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. United States Department of Agriculture
418 U.S. App. D.C. 223
| D.C. Cir. | 2015Background
- The USDA announced in 2004 it would apply the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) to birds not bred for research but said existing general AWA standards (written for mammals) may be inappropriate for birds and issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for bird-specific rules.
- Over the following decade the USDA repeatedly missed deadlines for bird-specific regulations and, according to PETA, declined to apply the AWA’s licensure, inspection, and general welfare regulations to birds in the interim; Agency statements to the public and FOIA responses sometimes indicated birds were not being regulated.
- PETA sued under the Administrative Procedure Act § 706(1), seeking (1) an order compelling the USDA to publish and promulgate bird-specific regulations (abandoned on appeal) and (2) an order compelling immediate enforcement of the AWA’s existing general welfare standards as to birds.
- The district court found PETA had organizational standing but dismissed the complaint under Heckler v. Chaney as asserting decisions committed to agency discretion; PETA appealed.
- The D.C. Circuit (Henderson) affirmed dismissal on alternative grounds: even assuming PETA’s allegations true, Norton v. SUWA limits § 706(1) claims to discrete agency actions that the agency is required by law to take; PETA failed to plausibly allege the USDA was legally required to enforce the general AWA standards against birds prior to completing bird-specific regulations.
- Judge Millett filed a dubitante opinion disagreeing with the majority’s standing analysis, warning that the court’s organizational-standing precedents may be in tension with Supreme Court limits on Article III injury (e.g., Linda R.S., Clapper, Lujan) and objecting to treating diversion-of-resources and lack of informational reports as cognizable Article III injuries when they stem from non-enforcement toward third parties.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing (organizational) | PETA: USDA’s non-enforcement and failure to produce inspection reports injured PETA’s programs and forced diversion of resources; that is a concrete injury. | USDA: PETA lacks Article III injury — its harms are manufactured, self-inflicted, or merely an interest in law enforcement. | Court: PETA has alleged a concrete organizational injury sufficient for standing under circuit precedent. |
| Reviewability under APA § 701(a)(2) (Heckler) | PETA: USDA’s alleged wholesale non-enforcement as to all birds is reviewable; AWA and licensing regime constrain USDA. | USDA: Enforcement decisions are committed to agency discretion; non-enforcement is presumptively unreviewable. | Court: Did not decide Heckler bar; affirmed dismissal on other ground (failure to state a § 706(1) claim under Norton). |
| § 706(1) claim — discrete, mandatory action required by law (Norton) | PETA: USDA has an obligation to apply AWA standards and licensing to bird exhibitors; decade-long abdication is a discrete failure to act. | USDA: Congress did not require application of the general mammal-derived standards to birds pending promulgation of bird-specific rules; discretion to set standards and enforcement timing remains. | Court: PETA failed to plausibly allege a required discrete agency action; Norton precludes broad programmatic relief. |
| Informational/diversion-of-resources injury | PETA: Lack of USDA inspection reports deprived PETA of information used in education and forced resource diversion; thus redressable. | USDA: No statutory right to reports; informational injury without a legal entitlement is insufficient; diversion may be self-inflicted. | Court: Under D.C. Circuit precedent, these allegations suffice for organizational standing, but do not establish a mandatory duty the court can compel under § 706(1). |
Key Cases Cited
- Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (§ 706(1) relief limited to discrete agency actions the law requires)
- Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (presumption that agency enforcement decisions are committed to agency discretion)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (organizational-standing doctrine: diversion of resources to counteract defendant’s conduct can be a concrete injury)
- Munsell v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 509 F.3d 572 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing limits of § 701(a) and affirming dismissal on alternative grounds)
- Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (organizational standing where agency information flows and avenues of redress were altered)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing requires concrete injury to a legally protected interest)