People ex rel. T.C.C., 2017 COA 138

Juvenile T.C.C. was adjudicated delinquent for conduct that would be robbery and third-degree assault if committed by an adult, based on an incident where he took a package, engaged in a physical altercation with Ronald Ipson, knocked Ipson’s phone from his hand, used racial epithets, and fled; video and witness Shen Smith corroborated Ipson’s account.
Police apprehended T.C.C. nearby after he discarded items; Ipson’s phone and phone case were later recovered; package owners disavowed requesting T.C.C. to retrieve the package.
At trial, the prosecutor argued in closing that Ipson had “no reason to make up” being struck by T.C.C.; T.C.C. raised a plain-error claim on appeal alleging improper vouching for witness credibility.
At sentencing, T.C.C. orally moved to waive mandatory fees (victim compensation fee, victim’s assistance surcharge, restorative justice fee, public defender fee) based on indigence; the court instead told T.C.C. that probation could seek waiver if he “did well,” and never ruled on the indigence motion.
On appeal, T.C.C. challenged both the alleged prosecutorial vouching and the court’s delegation/conditioning of fee waiver on good behavior rather than an indigency finding by the court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prosecutor improperly vouched for witness credibility in closing	Prosecutor’s statement that Ipson had “no reason to make up” the assault was improper vouching and prejudicial, warranting reversal for plain error	Statement was a reasonable inference from the evidence (video, witness ID, corroboration) and not improper personal opinion	No error; prosecutor’s remark was a permissible inference from the record and not plain error
Whether trial court could delegate fee-waiver decisions to probation or condition waiver on good behavior rather than indigence	Court erred by delegating waiver authority to probation and conditioning waiver on good behavior; statutory waiver is limited to court finding indigence	People argued victim-fee statutes don’t apply to juveniles or, if they do, absence of prohibitory language allows non-indigence bases for waiver	Error was plain: statutes require the court to decide waivers and permit waiver only upon a finding of indigence; remand for ruling on indigency-based motion

Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043 (discussing abuse-of-discretion review for prosecutorial misconduct)
Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089 (two-step evaluation of prosecutorial misconduct in closing)
People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36 (plain-error standard and rarity of reversing for prosecutorial misconduct)
People v. Simon, 266 P.3d 1099 (affirming Tillery principles)
People v. Wilson, 356 P.3d 956 (prosecutor may draw reasonable inferences about witness motives/truthfulness)
People v. Lowe, 60 P.3d 753 (fees and costs are payable absent indigency determination)
M.T. v. People, 269 P.3d 1219 (statutory interpretation principle: give effect to legislature's intent)
People v. Pollard, 307 P.3d 1124 (plain-error requires contravention of clear statutory command)
Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932 (interpret statutes by their plain language to effect legislative intent)