Peo v. Tarr, 2022 COA 23

Background

Tarr drove after drinking, ran a red light, and struck a pedestrian who died; officers had probable cause to suspect DUI.
At the hospital officers told Tarr Colorado’s expressed-consent statute applied and that he had to submit to alcohol testing; Tarr unequivocally said, “You’re not taking my blood.”
Officers began a warrant process but, after learning the pedestrian died, ordered three warrantless blood draws (1:19, 2:19, 3:15 a.m.); a warrant was signed 35 minutes after the third draw.
Blood tests showed BAC between .30 and .32. Tarr was tried and convicted on multiple charges including vehicular homicide–DUI and second-degree murder.
The Colorado Supreme Court (Tarr II) later held that a conscious driver may revoke statutory consent; the case was remanded to the court of appeals to address outstanding admissibility issues.
On remand the court of appeals concluded the warrantless blood draws were searches but affirmed admission of the BAC evidence under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule and affirmed Tarr’s convictions.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Tarr)	Held
Whether the warrantless blood draws were lawful under the Fourth Amendment because of Colorado’s expressed-consent statute	Expressed-consent statute and Hyde mean driver had no constitutional right to refuse when officers had probable cause for vehicular homicide	Tarr argued he explicitly revoked consent and statutory/constitutional voluntariness was not satisfied for a warrantless blood draw	Court: draws were searches and Tarr did not consent; Hyde’s earlier treatment changed by Tarr II, so statutory consent did not validate the draws here
Whether evidence should be excluded under the exclusionary rule or admitted under the good-faith exception	Evidence should be admissible because officers reasonably relied on § 42-4-1301.1(3) and prevailing Colorado law at the time	Tarr argued exclusion required because no warrant and no consent; neither inevitable-discovery nor good-faith exceptions apply	Court: applied good-faith exception — officers reasonably relied on expressed-consent statute and existing precedent; suppression would not further deterrence
Whether reliance on a statute that a later court invalidates can support the good-faith exception	People: officers can rely on a reasonable reading of statute even absent prior appellate decision directly authorizing the precise practice	Tarr: good-faith exception should be limited to searches relying on legal authority later adjudicated clearly unconstitutional or overridden	Court: good-faith exception applies where officer relied objectively reasonably on statute later held inapplicable; need not be limited to statutes later declared facially unconstitutional
Whether vehicular-homicide and murder charges, and resulting convictions, were improper or violated equal protection / sufficiency	People: statutes punish different conduct and intent; convictions premised on different factual theories (DUI proximate cause vs knowing conduct)	Tarr: vehicular-homicide scheme should preclude murder prosecution; charging both violates equal protection and evidence insufficient for knowing mens rea	Court: rejected legislative-preclusion/equal-protection claims; statutes differ in mental state and elements; evidence sufficient to support knowing mens rea for murder conviction

Key Cases Cited

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (blood draw is a search)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (consent voluntariness measured by totality of circumstances)
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (good-faith reliance on statute can justify admission despite later invalidation)
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (suppression only when officer knew or should have known search was unconstitutional)
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (exclusionary rule’s deterrence focus; limits on suppression)
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (no per se exigency for blood draws; reasonableness judged case-by-case)
People v. Hyde, 393 P.3d 962 (Colo. 2017) (Colorado held statutory consent sufficed in unconscious-driver context)
Tarr v. People, 549 P.3d 966 (Colo. 2024) (Tarr II — Colorado Supreme Court: conscious driver may revoke statutory consent; remanded)
People v. Schaufele, 325 P.3d 1060 (Colo. 2014) (blood draw is a search under Colorado law)
City of Kingman v. Ary, 475 P.3d 1240 (Kan. 2020) (Kansas court admitted evidence under good-faith exception after later ruling implied-consent law unconstitutional)
State v. German, 887 S.E.2d 912 (S.C. 2023) (similar facts; officers violated Fourth Amendment but evidence admitted under good faith)
People v. Barry, 349 P.3d 1139 (Colo. App. 2015) (analysis of deterrence and application of exclusionary rule)
Casillas v. People, 427 P.3d 804 (Colo. 2018) (good-faith exception applies when law relied on was later deemed invalid)