2020 COA 24
Colo. Ct. App.2020Background
- Defendant Ryan Stone stole a car and led police on a high-speed chase; a Colorado State Patrol trooper was struck and seriously injured. A jury convicted Stone of multiple offenses.
- The trial court held a restitution hearing and entered a written restitution order for $252,027.69. The restitution award included payments to the local crime victim compensation board (the board) for the trooper’s brother’s travel and the trooper’s girlfriend’s lost wages, and payments to the state workers’ compensation administrator (the administrator), including permanent partial disability benefits.
- The board had reimbursed the brother’s travel and the girlfriend’s lost wages; the administrator paid temporary and later permanent partial disability benefits to the trooper.
- Defendant objected that (a) the brother and girlfriend were not "victims" under the restitution statute, (b) the prosecution failed to prove proximate cause for those losses, (c) permanent partial disability benefits are barred as loss of future earnings, and (d) he lacked notice of the administrator’s permanent-disability claim.
- The court affirmed restitution to the board and the administrator (permanent partial disability), found the prosecution met proximate-cause proof for the brother and girlfriend, found the notice error harmless, but reversed a $979.41 award to the trooper for the mother’s travel expenses as a clerical error and directed correction on remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the term "victim" for restitution to a crime victim compensation board is defined by the general restitution statute or by the crime victim compensation statute | Board (and thus the board’s reimbursed payees) qualifies as a "victim" because the board paid claims and §24-4.1.102 definition governs awards involving boards | The restitution statute’s definition controls; the brother and girlfriend are not "victims" under §18-1.3-602(4)(a) unless the trooper was deceased or incapacitated | The compensation-board statute controls for board awards; the board is a victim under §18‑1.3‑602(4)(a)(IV) and the board’s own definitions (§24‑4.1‑102) apply |
| Whether prosecution proved proximate cause for the brother’s travel expenses and girlfriend’s lost wages | Testimony showed relatives came and girlfriend missed work to care for the trooper; these were natural and probable consequences of defendant’s conduct | Insufficient proof that the losses were proximately caused by defendant; e.g., support might have been moral or outside working hours | Court found sufficient evidence by a preponderance that defendant proximately caused both the brother’s travel and the girlfriend’s lost wages |
| Whether permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits paid by the administrator are barred as "loss of future earnings" under restitution law | PPD payments are insurer payouts determined by statute and compensable as pecuniary losses; they are not the same as a direct loss of future earnings | PPD represents compensation for future earning capacity loss and thus is barred by the restitution exclusion for loss of future earnings | Court held PPD benefits compensate for permanent impairment/earning capacity (not actual future wages) and are recoverable as restitution to the administrator |
| Whether late notice of the administrator’s claim for PPD requires a new restitution hearing | Prosecution argued defendant knew workers’ compensation claims were sought and was not prejudiced; any notice defect was harmless | Lack of notice deprived defendant of opportunity to defend and entitles him to a new hearing | Court concluded defendant lacked adequate notice but the error was harmless because the PPD issue was resolved on the merits and no other prejudice was shown |
| Clerical error awarding $979.41 to the trooper for mother’s travel | Prosecution conceded the proposed order mistakenly included that amount | Defendant sought correction under Crim. P. 36 | Court reversed and directed the trial court on remand to remove the $979.41 award |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Lassek, 122 P.3d 1029 (Colo. App. 2005) (attendance or expenses that are a natural and probable consequence of defendant’s conduct may be attributable for restitution)
- People v. Bryant, 122 P.3d 1026 (Colo. App. 2005) (definition of "loss of future earnings" in restitution context)
- Bus. Ins. Co. v. BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., Inc., 23 P.3d 1261 (Colo. 2001) (permanent partial disability compensates for impairment and reduced earning capacity, not direct future wage loss)
- Vail Assocs., Inc. v. West, 692 P.2d 1111 (Colo. 1984) (worker may receive permanent disability payments even if actual wages post-injury are unchanged)
- Hobbs v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 804 P.2d 210 (Colo. App. 1990) (benefit entitlement based on open labor-market employability)
- People v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272 (Colo. App. 2010) (definition and application of proximate cause in restitution matters)
- People v. Weller, 679 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1984) (specific statutory provisions prevail over general ones)
- People v. Lunsford, 43 P.3d 629 (Colo. App. 2001) (insurer’s payouts can constitute pecuniary damages recoverable through restitution)