Peo v. Martinez, 22CA1065

Richard Lawrence Martinez was convicted by a jury on charges including first-degree murder (extreme indifference) and attempted first-degree murder, following a shooting incident where Matthew Bond was killed.
At trial, Martinez asserted he fired in self-defense, claiming he did not know Bond was in the vehicle and intended to shoot at Seth Eberly, who had allegedly threatened his partner.
During deliberations, the jury asked for and was given a calculator by the court, without prior notice or consultation with counsel for either party.
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing the jury’s use of a calculator constituted the introduction of extraneous information and that granting the request without their input violated Martinez’s constitutional rights.
The trial court denied the mistrial, characterizing the calculator as an ordinary office supply that aided organization, not as extraneous evidence.
Martinez appealed only on the ground of the jury’s use of the calculator, not on the underlying facts or merits of the conviction itself.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the court’s provision of a calculator to the jury without consulting defense counsel violated Martinez’s constitutional rights	The calculator was an aid for organizing evidence and performing calculations based on trial evidence, not an extraneous influence	The jury’s use of the calculator and the lack of consultation with the defense constituted a critical stage error impacting the right to a fair trial	Even if error, any violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; calculator’s use was within scope of evidence and not improper
Whether jury’s use of a calculator introduced extraneous evidence or impermissibly influenced the verdict	Calculator functioned as an administrative tool for processing admitted evidence	Calculator amounted to the introduction of extrinsic evidence or posed risk of improper influence on deliberations	Jury’s use was permissible; no extraneous evidence was introduced; no reversible error occurred

Key v. People, 865 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1994) (defining "critical stage" of proceedings and harmless error analysis for rights of presence and counsel)
Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d 1252 (Colo. 1986) (right to be present/counsel triggered by judge-jury communications during deliberations)
People v. Thompson, 121 P.3d 273 (Colo. App. 2005) (improper for jury to consider information outside trial evidence)
People v. Isom, 140 P.3d 100 (Colo. App. 2005) (harmless error if court properly responds to jury’s question during deliberations)
Kendrick v. Pippin, 252 P.3d 1052 (Colo. 2011) (jurors may use professional expertise to analyze trial evidence if not introducing extraneous information)