Peo v. Martinez, 22CA1065

Richard Lawrence Martinez was convicted by a jury in Boulder County, Colorado, of first-degree murder (extreme indifference), second-degree murder (as a lesser included offense), attempted first-degree murder (extreme indifference), and crime-of-violence counts.
The conviction arose from Martinez shooting at a moving car, killing Matthew Bond and allegedly targeting Seth Eberly after a prior altercation involving Martinez’s partner and Eberly.
Martinez claimed he acted in self-defense and was unaware that Bond was in the car.
During jury deliberations, the jury requested and was provided a calculator by the court without prior consultation with Martinez or his counsel.
Martinez’s counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing the provision of a calculator constituted reversible error as it injected extraneous information and occurred at a critical stage without the defendant’s presence.
The trial court denied the mistrial motion, reasoning the calculator was akin to other office supplies aiding deliberations.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether providing the jury a calculator during deliberations without consulting defense violated constitutional rights	The calculator was an aid for organizing evidence, not introducing extraneous information; its use was proper and not prejudicial	Failing to consult defense at a critical stage and allowing the calculator improperly introduced outside information, prejudicing the defendant	No reversible error; calculator use was within evidence's scope, and any procedural error was harmless
Whether the jury’s use of the calculator constituted juror misconduct by bringing in extraneous information	Calculator use stayed within the evidence presented and did not create new evidence	Calculator was a specialized device capable of complex math, potentially beyond pen-and-paper calculations, creating risk of extraneous data	Use merely facilitated examination of record evidence; not improper or misconduct

Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d 1252 (Colo. 1986) (defendant’s rights implicated when judge communicates with jury at a critical stage)
Key v. People, 865 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1994) (critical stage definition, harmless error standard)
People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2005) (jury’s use of outside materials constitutes extraneous influence and reversible error)
Kendrick v. Pippin, 252 P.3d 1052 (Colo. 2011) (jurors may use their professional expertise to analyze trial evidence if they do not introduce outside information)