479 F.Supp.3d 840
N.D. Cal.2020Background
- Plaintiffs Penrose Hill, Ltd. (a Delaware winery) and CEO Philip James sued blogger Paul Mabray for defamation based on a Dec. 11, 2017 blog post and a 2019 Tweet that linked to it; suit filed Feb. 14, 2020.
- The Blog Post criticized certain online/private‑label wine businesses as “fakers,” recounted prior controversial episodes involving James, and alleged that Penrose Hill/Firstleaf repackaged low‑quality wine.
- In 2019 Mabray tweeted a link to the Blog Post; the Twitter preview displayed the article title, James’s photo, and a short quote (“Some good, some fakers.”).
- Defendant moved to strike under California’s anti‑SLAPP statute and for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and damages.
- The court held the bulk of the Blog Post was time‑barred (one‑year statute) but the Tweet preview republished limited content; it denied the anti‑SLAPP motion and granted Rule 12(c) dismissal because the Tweet’s challenged statements were non‑actionable opinion.
- Plaintiffs were given leave to amend; anti‑SLAPP fees request was not granted because the special motion was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / Republication | The 2019 Tweet republished the Blog Post and reset the statute of limitations. | The Blog Post (Dec. 2017) is outside the 1‑year limitations period; a mere link does not republish. | Blog Post statements are time‑barred; the Tweet preview (title/photo/short quote) constituted a limited republication and is timely. |
| Anti‑SLAPP (public interest) | The statements concern the wine industry and consumer protection, so speech is tied to a public issue. | The Tweet is protected speech about business models and is made in a public forum. | Anti‑SLAPP denied: the Tweet’s content lacked sufficient closeness to a public interest issue to qualify for the statute’s protection. |
| Defamation — Fact vs. Opinion | The Tweet preview and link conveyed false, defamatory facts about James and Penrose Hill. | The Tweet and preview are opinionated, vague rhetoric (“fakers”), not provably false factual assertions. | Rule 12(c) granted: the Tweet’s challenged words are non‑actionable opinion and do not imply verifiable false facts. |
| Remedy / Pleading | Plaintiffs seek to proceed on defamation claim and injunctive relief. | Defendant seeks dismissal (and fees) based on statute of limitations, anti‑SLAPP, and lack of falsity/actual malice. | Complaint dismissed as to time‑barred Blog Post statements and as to the Tweet (opinion); leave to amend granted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 2018) (federal courts must permit discovery for factual anti‑SLAPP challenges; legal challenges evaluated under Rule 12/8 standards)
- Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (statements of opinion are not actionable absent a provably false factual connotation)
- Shively v. Bozanich, 31 Cal.4th 1230 (Cal. 2003) (single‑publication rule and when republication accrues a new cause of action)
- Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2012) (hosting a statement on a website without more is not republication; republication requires alteration or direction to a new audience)
- Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 660 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2011) (continuing to host a website does not constitute republication)
- Underwager v. Channel 9 Australia, 69 F.3d 361 (9th Cir. 1995) (three‑part test for whether a statement implies provable facts: broad context, specific context/content, and factuality of the statement)
- FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., 7 Cal.5th 133 (2019) (public‑interest inquiry for anti‑SLAPP requires a meaningful connection between the speech and the public issue)