137 A.3d 211
Md.2016Background
- Tracey Adkins, a long‑time employee of Peninsula Regional Medical Center (PRMC), had hip surgery in 2011 and returned with medical restrictions limiting her to sedentary/light duty (lift ≤10 lbs, occasional standing/walking).
- PRMC approved 12 weeks FMLA and later extended leave 14 more weeks; during leave Adkins applied or inquired about several open positions (Inventory Control Coordinator, Core Technician, Patient Service Rep) and submitted medical notes to Employee Health.
- PRMC did not place Adkins in another position and terminated her employment when the extended leave ended in February 2012; Adkins sued under Maryland FEPA for failure to accommodate and intentional disability discrimination.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment for PRMC; the Court of Special Appeals reversed as to actual‑disability discrimination and failure to accommodate; PRMC appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals.
- Central legal question: whether a “qualified individual with a disability” under COMAR/FEPA may include an employee who cannot perform the essential functions of her current job but can perform the essential functions of a different (reassignment) position with or without accommodation, and whether PRMC engaged in the required individualized/interactive assessment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a person who cannot perform her current job may still be a "qualified individual" by showing she can perform essential functions of a reassignment position | Adkins: FEPA/COMAR allow reassignment as a reasonable accommodation; "job in question" includes positions the employee seeks; she could do Inventory Control Coordinator with accommodation | PRMC: "Job in question" means current job; employer has no duty to reassign; plaintiff must first prove she is qualified for current position | Court: "Qualified" includes ability to perform essential functions of a reassignment position; reassignment may establish qualification, so summary judgment inappropriate on that basis |
| Whether PRMC satisfied duty to conduct an individualized assessment/interactive process | Adkins: PRMC did not meaningfully assess positions or explore accommodations despite notice and medical restrictions | PRMC: Adkins failed to cooperate in the process and was expected to apply for posted jobs; employer provided extended leave | Court: Genuine dispute whether PRMC performed individualized assessment in good faith; a jury could find PRMC failed to engage and relied on overly rigid requirements (e.g., full release) |
| Whether Inventory Control Coordinator position could be performed by Adkins with reasonable accommodation | Adkins: Prior experience in Cath Lab and factual testimony support that heavy lifting/walking were not essential or could be accommodated | PRMC: Job requires substantial walking/lifting; incumbent testimony and written description show essential physical demands | Court: Material factual disputes exist about essential functions and accommodation feasibility; summary judgment improper as to this position |
| Whether Core Technician and Patient Service Rep positions were feasible accommodations | Adkins: Could be accommodated or duties modified/assistance provided | PRMC: Core Tech requires frequent heavy lifting beyond Adkins’ restrictions; PSR requires unrelated secretarial experience | Court: Core Tech—Adkins cannot perform essential heavy lifting as a matter of law; PSR—Adkins lacks required secretarial qualifications; these positions cannot support her claim on remand |
| Whether termination was discriminatory (intent) | Adkins: Termination after leave exhaustion, combined with failure to accommodate, permits an inference of discriminatory intent | PRMC: Termination was due to exhaustion of leave; supervisors did not view her as disabled | Court: Circumstantial evidence suffices to create a fact issue whether termination was because of disability; summary judgment inappropriate on intentional discrimination |
Key Cases Cited
- Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995) (pre‑1992 Rehabilitation Act ruling criticized as unduly narrow on reassignment)
- Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting Myers and recognizing reassignment may qualify an employee)
- Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (collecting circuits holding reassignment can satisfy "qualified" status)
- Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. City, 214 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2000) (reassignment and interactive process principals; failure to engage may preclude summary judgment)
- Hall v. U.S. Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1988) (essential‑function analysis is fact specific; courts must scrutinize employer justifications)
- Gaither v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 94 Md. App. 569 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (pre‑2001 FEPA interpretation; relied on earlier Rehabilitation Act precedent)