Pena v. Gibson, 3:12-cv-01111

In 2009 a Santa Clara County jury convicted Alfredo Rudy Pena of first-degree murder and first-degree robbery for the May 6, 2007 killing of Johanna Giron; Pena received 75 years to life.
Key evidence: Pena’s DNA matched samples from Giron’s hand and the cloth bindings; phone records show many calls between Pena and Giron near the time of death; Pena admitted being at Giron’s room that night, stealing her laptop, and later charges matched use of her credit card.
Pretrial, Pena sought to admit evidence that a third party, Turo Collins, called Giron that day, was near the hotel, had time/opportunity, and had a history of violence; the trial court excluded this evidence as insufficiently probative and likely to consume undue time.
Pena also challenged the trial court’s use of CALCRIM No. 376 (possession of recently stolen property) as read to the jury, specifically the phrase allowing a conviction based on “slight” supporting evidence.
Pena exhausted state appeals; the California Court of Appeal rejected both claims and this federal habeas petition appealed those rulings under AEDPA standards.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Exclusion of third-party culpability evidence (Collins)	Excluding Collins evidence deprived Pena of due process and the ability to present a defense; Collins had motive/opportunity and suspicious behavior.	The Collins evidence lacked direct or circumstantial link to the murder (only an unproven phone call); admission would be speculative and wasteful.	Court held exclusion was reasonable; evidence lacked probative value, and no prejudice given strong inculpatory evidence.
CALCRIM No. 376—use of the word “slight”	The instruction’s reference to “slight” supporting evidence unconstitutionally reduced the prosecution’s burden and diluted proof beyond a reasonable doubt.	The instruction describes a permissive inference and expressly reiterated the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard; jurors were properly instructed overall.	Court held the instruction did not lower the burden of proof and did not prejudice Pena; claim denied.

Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (permissible bounds on presenting third-party culpability evidence and exclusion for lack of probative value)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (standards for "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" under AEDPA)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (petitioner's burden when state-court decision lacks rationale)
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (prosecution must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt)
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (federal relief for jury instruction errors only when instruction so infects trial as to violate due process)
Phillips v. Herndon, 730 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2013) (Ninth Circuit decisions upholding exclusion of insubstantial third-party culpability evidence)