Pena, Martin, WR-84,073-01

Background

Applicant Martin Pena pleaded guilty to possession of at least 400 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver after arrest; one arresting officer, Marcos Carrion, engaged in deliberate misconduct by stealing cocaine, replacing it with sheetrock and trace amounts of cocaine, and arranging arrests to conceal the theft.
Carrion’s conduct was intentional, systemic, and intended to make trafficking partners believe seizures had occurred; he thus manufactured and tampered with physical evidence used in the prosecution.
Applicant sought habeas relief on the theory that Carrion’s fabrication and nondisclosure of impeachment evidence rendered his plea involuntary or otherwise necessitated relief under Texas false-evidence jurisprudence and statutory suppression rules.
The Court examined whether the officer’s misconduct (a) required suppression under Article 38.23/tampering law, (b) entitled Applicant to a lesser‑included offense instruction, and (c) rendered Applicant’s plea involuntary under false‑evidence/Brady principles.
The concurrence agrees Carrion’s acts were willful and appalling but concludes relief is not required because (1) the evidence Carrion manufactured was impeachment (not exculpatory) evidence and (2) United States v. Ruiz limits the constitutional right to pre‑plea disclosure of impeachment evidence.

Issues

Issue	Applicant's Argument	State/Respondent's Argument	Held
Whether officer’s fabrication/tampering required suppression under Article 38.23	Carrion manufactured cocaine; suppression required because evidence was illegally obtained/tampered	Applicant actually possessed the package and intended to possess the charged aggregate weight; tampering did not create a suppression basis	No suppression — conviction not barred by Article 38.23 under these facts
Whether Applicant was entitled to a lesser‑included instruction (lesser weight)	Evidence that cocaine was adulterated (sheetrock) could reduce aggregate weight and support lesser offense	Under statutory definition of adulterants/dilutants and precedents, aggregate weight includes adulterants regardless of how/when added; no rational juror evidence to convict only of lesser amount	No lesser‑included instruction warranted
Whether fabricated/impeachment evidence rendered plea involuntary under false‑evidence/Brady principles	Intentional, systemic fabrication by a prosecution team member could have materially affected decision to plead; plea therefore involuntary	Evidence was impeachment (not exculpatory); Ruiz controls — no constitutional right to pre‑plea disclosure of impeachment evidence; applicant still would have been convicted	No relief on plea‑involuntariness grounds; Ruiz forecloses a per se rule requiring pre‑plea disclosure of impeachment evidence
Whether Texas false‑evidence precedents (Palmberg, Barnaby, Coty, etc.) require a different materiality standard when officer misconduct is intentional	Applicant: Barnaby materiality-to‑decision standard should apply; intentional misconduct could be material to plea decision	Court applied outcome‑oriented Brady‑style analysis and found applicant would have been convicted at trial; concurrence worries Court limited Palmberg without explanation but follows Ruiz	Court declines to expand relief; concurrence concurs in result but critiques narrowing of Palmberg and interplay with Barnaby/Coty

Key Cases Cited

Ex parte Palmberg, 491 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (discusses false‑evidence theory and pre‑trial fairness in plea context)
Ex parte Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (materiality standard for false evidence as whether false evidence likely affected decision to plead)
Ex parte Owens, 515 S.W.3d 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (treatment of due‑process concerns arising from lab misconduct and plea voluntariness)
Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (five‑factor test for presumption of falsity in systemic misconduct cases and materiality requirement)
Cawthon v. State, 849 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (elements for including adulterants/dilutants in aggregate weight)
Seals v. State, 187 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (legislative expansion of adulterant/dilutant definition eliminating temporal/causal limits)
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (U.S. 1970) (recognition that misrepresentations can render plea involuntary)
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (U.S. 2002) (no constitutional right to pre‑plea disclosure of impeachment evidence)
Ex parte Mable, 443 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (distinguishing exculpatory lab results from impeachment evidence)