Pelloat, James Allen
WR-75,934-04
| Tex. App. | Nov 4, 2015Background
- James Allen Pelloat pleaded guilty in Newton County (March 24, 2005) to four felony counts (two sexual assault, two improper relationship under Tex. Penal Code §21.12) as part of a plea bargain resolving multiple indictments; he was sentenced to 20 years on each count (some consecutive, some concurrent).
- Pelloat later filed postconviction habeas claims and a motion for reconsideration claiming newly discovered records (transcript and findings) showed counsel and the prosecutor withheld or misstated material information (dates, applicability of §21.12, and parole consequences).
- The state trial court entered findings concluding Pelloat’s pleas were knowing and voluntary, counsel was aware of the §21.12 effective date, and counsel did not render ineffective assistance. Habeas relief was denied (Sept. 20, 2011).
- Pelloat relied in part on arguments that some charges were ex post facto or based on incorrect offense dates (affecting statute applicability and indictment validity), and that counsel’s failures made his pleas involuntary under Strickland/Hill.
- The opinion extensively discusses and applies Ex parte Moussazadeh and related Texas Court of Criminal Appeals precedent about when counsel’s misinformation regarding parole eligibility can render a plea involuntary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Pelloat) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel's misinformation or failure to disclose parole-eligibility consequences can render a guilty plea involuntary | Counsel misadvised or failed to disclose parole eligibility/consequences; Pelloat would not have pled if correctly informed | Parole attainment is speculative; prior precedent required parole eligibility to be an essential part of the plea bargain to show involuntariness | Court: Erroneous requirement reversed — counsel's misinformation about parole eligibility can constitute deficient performance under Strickland; voluntariness judged by whether, but for counsel's error, defendant would have pled |
| Whether parole-eligibility must be an express/essential term of the plea agreement to support habeas relief | Pelloat contends eligibility need not be an express term; misadvice alone suffices | State relied on Ex parte Evans and Moussazadeh II holding eligibility must be an affirmative/essential part of plea | Court: Overrules/abrogates prior rule; parole-eligibility need not be an express element — focus is Strickland deficiency and prejudice |
| Whether counsel’s failures about offense dates/indictment validity (ex post facto / improper statute application) and plea advisements constituted ineffective assistance | Counsel failed to recognize invalid indictments and applicable statute dates and thus led to involuntary plea | State contends counsel reviewed discovery, advised appropriately, and plea papers/judicial confessions show voluntary pleas | Court: Applies Strickland framework — deficiencies must be proved and prejudice shown; court stresses objective reasonableness and that clear legal consequences must be correctly advised |
| Whether petitioner met Strickland prejudice prong (would have gone to trial) | Pelloat asserts affidavits that he would not have pled if properly informed | State counters Pelloat failed to meet preponderance and plea colloquy/records show knowing/voluntary plea | Court: Prejudice requires a showing that but for counsel's error the defendant would have chosen trial; courts must evaluate credibility and the record (outcome depends on proof) |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Moussazadeh, 361 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (court reconsiders prior holdings and holds counsel's incorrect advice about parole eligibility can be constitutionally deficient and prejudice a plea)
- Ex parte Moussazadeh, 64 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (earlier opinion discussed parole-eligibility and voluntariness; later disavowed in part)
- Ex parte Evans, 690 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (prior rule requiring parole-eligibility to be an essential term of a plea; disavowed by Moussazadeh)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel: deficiency and prejudice)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (Strickland framework applied to guilty pleas—counsel's advice can render plea involuntary)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (U.S. 2010) (counsel must give correct advice about clear immigration consequences of a plea; cited for principle that clear consequences require accurate advice)