Pelloat, James Allen
WR-75,934-02
Tex. App.Nov 4, 2015Background
- James Allen Pelloat pleaded guilty on March 24, 2005 to four felony counts (two sexual assault, two improper-relationship counts) as part of a plea bargain resolving multiple indictments; sentences of 20 years were imposed, with two sentences to run consecutively; credit for 138 days was given.
- Pelloat later filed post-conviction habeas applications and an amended C.C.P. art. 11.07 application after discovering supplemental records (trial transcript, findings of fact & conclusions of law) he says were not available at trial.
- His collateral claims allege ineffective assistance of counsel based on withheld or incorrect information: (1) counsel and the prosecutor knew of statutory changes (Sept. 1, 2003) affecting Penal Code § 21.12 and parole/eligibility issues, and (2) counsel failed to advise him properly about dates/indictments and consequences, rendering his plea involuntary under Strickland.
- The state habeas judge entered findings that counsel had the evidence, advised Pelloat of elements, and that pleas were knowing and voluntary; relief was denied by the trial court on Sep 20, 2011.
- The opinion excerpted relies heavily on Ex parte Moussazadeh (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), in which the Court reconsidered standards for when counsel's erroneous parole advice can render a plea involuntary and overruled aspects of Ex parte Evans.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Pelloat) | Defendant's Argument (State / Trial Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel's withholding/misinformation about statutes and indictment dates rendered plea involuntary | Counsel knew of Sept. 1, 2003 enactment (affecting §21.12) and concealed conflicts/dates, so plea was not knowing/voluntary | Counsel had discovery, advised Pelloat on elements, dates supported plea, and plea papers/judicial confessions show voluntariness | Trial court found plea knowing and voluntary; habeas denied (but court of appeals / CCA precedent discussed altered standards in Moussazadeh) |
| Whether ex post facto or invalid-indictment issues existed (dates/charges) | Some counts relied on dates/charges pre- or post-enactment producing legal impossibility or ex post facto problems that defense should have raised | State treated relevant counts as proper based on evidence that conduct continued into dates after statute effective; judgment dates align with plea | Trial-level findings: evidence supported that conduct continued into 2004 and counsel reasonably allowed plea; no relief granted |
| Whether misinformation regarding parole eligibility (or failure to advise) can make plea involuntary | Incorrect advice about consequences (parole/mandatory supervision) influenced decision to plead; thus Strickland prejudice shown | Parole attainment is speculative; prior precedent required parole eligibility to be an essential term of plea to trigger relief | Ex parte Moussazadeh clarified law: parole eligibility is a direct, statutorily determinable consequence; incorrect advice can be deficient under Strickland without being an "essential term" of the plea; relief may be available if prejudicial |
| Standard for proving ineffective assistance on plea-based claim | Pelloat asserts counsel performance was deficient and prejudice exists because he would not have pled | State requires applicant to meet Strickland two-prong test and historically demanded stronger showing re: parole being part of bargain | Controlling standard is Strickland; defendant must show deficient performance and a reasonable probability he would have proceeded to trial instead of pleading; Moussazadeh explains parole-eligibility advice may be critical to that inquiry |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Moussazadeh, 361 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (clarifies that erroneous parole-eligibility advice can constitute deficient performance under Strickland and disavows parts of Ex parte Evans)
- Ex parte Evans, 690 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (prior rule treating parole-eligibility misinformation as not rendering plea involuntary; partially overruled by Moussazadeh)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (U.S. 2010) (counsel must give correct immigration-consequence advice; influenced modern view of counsel's duty to advise on clear collateral consequences)