Pelletier v. Campbell (Slip Opinion), 109 N.E.3d 1210

On August 26, 2013, Judith Pelletier ran a stop sign at the intersection of Sanderson Ave. and 12th St. in Campbell, Ohio, and collided with another vehicle; she testified she did not see the stop sign because trees/bushes in the devil strip obscured it.
The stop sign was mandated by the Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices and thus qualifies as a “traffic control device” included in the statutory definition of a public road.
The foliage was located in the devil strip approximately 34 feet, 2 inches in front of the stop sign (not on the sign itself or on the traveled portion of the roadway).
Pelletier sued the city of Campbell (and others), alleging the city negligently failed to maintain vegetation so the mandated stop sign was visible; city moved for summary judgment asserting statutory immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744.
Trial court denied summary judgment; the Seventh District affirmed, holding factual issues existed under R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) (failure to keep public roads in repair / failure to remove obstructions).
The Ohio Supreme Court granted discretionary review and reversed, holding the city was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a mandated traffic-control device is "not in repair" when an extraneous condition (foliage off the roadway) makes it less visible	Pelletier: a stop sign that is rendered ineffective or indiscernible by foliage is not "in repair" and the city must maintain the device	City: "in repair" means physically deteriorated, disassembled, or damaged; extraneous vegetation does not alter the sign's physical condition	Held: "In repair" depends on the physical condition; sign was in repair, so no liability for failure to keep public roads in repair
Whether the city had a duty under R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) to remove foliage that obstructed visibility though the foliage was in the devil strip (not on the roadway or the sign)	Pelletier: the statute imposes a duty to remove obstructions that make a traffic-control device ineffective; an obstruction need not be literally on the device	City: the duty to "remove obstructions from public roads" reaches only obstructions that originate on the public road (roadway, bridge, or mandated device) — devil strip vegetation is excluded	Held: "from" requires the obstruction to originate on the public road; foliage in the devil strip was not on the sign or roadway, so the statute’s obstruction exception did not apply

Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312 (statutory language that is plain and unambiguous must be applied, not interpreted)
Heckert v. Patrick, 15 Ohio St.3d 402 (construing duty to keep roads in proper repair as concerning deterioration or disassembly)
Howard v. Miami Twp. Fire Div., 119 Ohio St.3d 1 (definition of "obstruction" as an obstacle that blocks or clogs the roadway)
Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284 (entitlement to political-subdivision immunity is a legal question for the court; summary-judgment standard guidance)