Peguy Delva v. The Continental Group, Inc., 137 So. 3d 371

Peguy Delva, a front-desk manager, sued her employer alleging adverse employment actions (heightened scrutiny, denial of shift changes/coverage, and scheduling after maternity leave) because she was pregnant.
The trial court dismissed Delva’s complaint for failure to state a claim; the Third District affirmed, holding the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) does not prohibit pregnancy discrimination.
The Third District acknowledged conflict with the Fourth District (Carsillo), which held the FCRA’s prohibition on sex discrimination includes pregnancy. The Third District relied on authority treating pregnancy as outside ‘sex’ absent a statutory amendment like the federal PDA.
The Florida Supreme Court granted review to resolve the district-court conflict and interpret § 760.10(1)(a) (prohibiting discrimination “because of … sex”).
The Court held that pregnancy is a natural condition unique to the female sex and therefore discrimination based on pregnancy is subsumed within the FCRA’s prohibition of sex discrimination; the Court quashed the Third District, approved Carsillo’s result, and remanded to reinstate Delva’s complaint.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the FCRA’s prohibition of discrimination “because of … sex” includes pregnancy	Pregnancy discrimination is inherently sex-based because pregnancy is a condition unique to females	The plain meaning of “sex” is gender (male/female); pregnancy is a separate condition and Florida did not amend the FCRA like Congress amended Title VII	Yes — pregnancy discrimination is subsumed within “sex” under § 760.10(1)(a); complaint should not have been dismissed
Whether legislative inaction (no amendment after Gilbert/PDA) indicates exclusion of pregnancy from FCRA	Legislative silence does not change the FCRA’s liberal remedial purpose; statute should be construed to prevent sex-based discrimination including pregnancy	Failure to amend signals that Florida did not intend to include pregnancy	Legislative inaction is not dispositive; liberal construction of FCRA favors inclusion of pregnancy

Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (U.S. 1976) (held pregnancy exclusion was not sex discrimination under Title VII prior to the PDA)
Carsillo v. City of Lake Worth, 995 So.2d 1118 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (held FCRA’s sex discrimination prohibition includes pregnancy)
O'Loughlin v. Pinebrook, 579 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (discussed Gilbert and noted Florida had not amended its act to mirror the federal PDA)
Mass. Elec. Co. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 375 N.E.2d 1192 (Mass. 1978) (reasoned pregnancy is a primary characteristic of the female sex and thus sex-linked)
Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. 1979) (concluded pregnancy discrimination is subsumed within state sex-discrimination law)