Peguero Vasquez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 422

Petitioner Jose Ramon Peguero Vasquez, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in 2017 to criminal possession of a forged instrument (N.Y. Penal Law § 170.20), a Class A misdemeanor; record indicates a fine and a one-year sentence.
DHS placed him in removal proceedings under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) as convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) "for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed."
In 2019 New York enacted Penal Law § 70.15(1-a), retroactively reducing the maximum sentence for Class A misdemeanors from 365/one year to 364 days.
Petitioner argued the state’s retroactive reduction means his 2017 conviction no longer qualifies as a CIMT carrying a possible one-year sentence, and he also raised a vagueness challenge to the CIMT ground.
The IJ and the BIA rejected retroactive effect for immigration purposes (relying on Matter of Velasquez‑Rios), found the forged-instrument offense a CIMT, and sustained removability; the Second Circuit majority denied review, with Judge Robinson dissenting.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether New York’s 2019 retroactive reduction of the maximum misdemeanor sentence removes a prior state conviction from qualifying as a CIMT "for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed."	Peguero Vasquez: NY § 70.15(1-a) is retroactive under state law, so the 2017 conviction is for an offense punishable only up to 364 days and therefore does not meet INA’s one-year threshold.	DHS/BIA: Section 237 is backward‑looking and consults the law in effect at the time of conviction; subsequent state sentencing reductions (even if retroactive for state law) do not change federal immigration consequences.	Majority: INA unambiguously refers to the law at the time of conviction; decline to give state retroactive sentencing changes effect for removal. Petition denied.
Whether the CIMT ground is unconstitutionally vague as applied to a fraud‑based forgery conviction.	Peguero Vasquez: Post‑Dimaya/Johnson doctrine renders the CIMT standard vague.	Government: Longstanding Supreme Court precedent (Jordan v. De George) treats fraud‑based offenses as CIMTs; circuits have upheld that view.	Held: Rejects vagueness challenge; Jordan controls and fraud‑ingredient offenses qualify as CIMTs.

McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816 (2011) (statute referring to maximum penalty for prior conviction is assessed by the law "applicable at the time of that conviction").
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (crimes with fraud as an ingredient traditionally constitute crimes involving moral turpitude).
Saleh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2007) (federal immigration law may disregard state vacaturs/relief granted to avoid immigration consequences).
Doe v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 203 (2d Cir. 2018) (immigration removability is determined by law in effect at time of conviction; subsequent statutory changes do not necessarily negate removability).
Velasquez‑Rios v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2021) (affirming BIA’s refusal to apply a retroactive state misdemeanor sentencing cut to avoid immigration consequences).
Dimaya v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (void‑for‑vagueness doctrine in immigration context; discussed in relation to CIMT challenges).
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (vagueness analysis for the residual clause; cited by petitioner but distinguished by the court).