Peggy Jo Smith v. Professional Transportation, 5 F.4th 700

Peggy Jo Smith worked for Professional Transportation Inc. (PTI) and resigned in August 2013 alleging unpaid overtime; she filed suit on December 26, 2013 "individually and on behalf of similarly situated" employees under the FLSA.
Over 100 PTI employees timely filed opt-in written consents; Smith did not file a separate written consent form beyond her complaint.
The district court, relying on Harkins, held that a named plaintiff must file a separate written consent to commence an FLSA collective action for statute-of-limitations purposes; by the time the court reached that conclusion limitations had run and the court dismissed the case in full.
On appeal Smith challenged only the dismissal of her individual claims; the Seventh Circuit declined to resolve the broader question whether a named plaintiff must file a separate consent form and instead focused on whether Smith adequately pleaded and preserved individual claims.
The Seventh Circuit held that federal pleading rules permit suing in dual capacities (individual + representative), that Smith’s operative complaint and later record evidence put PTI on notice of her individual claims, and thus vacated the summary judgment dismissal as to her individual claims and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a named plaintiff must file a separate written consent form in addition to pleading to participate in an FLSA collective action	Complaint (and counsel’s filing) suffices to show named plaintiff’s consent to proceed collectively	Statute and Harkins require a separately filed written consent to commence the collective action and toll limitations	Court declined to decide the question (issue left open) due to unsettled law and limited briefing
Whether Smith could proceed in dual capacities and whether her complaint sufficiently pleaded individual claims	Smith pleaded individual facts, stated she sued "individually and on behalf of similarly situated" persons, and later testimony/filings showed PTI understood she was suing individually	Lack of a separate consent (and labels in complaint) meant no individual claim was properly before the court	Court held FRCP and pleading suffice for dual-capacity suits; complaint and later record put PTI on notice; individual claims may proceed — vacated dismissal and remanded

Harkins v. Riverboat Servs., Inc., 385 F.3d 1099 (7th Cir. 2004) (held that written consents are important for FLSA collectives; cited by district court)
Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 852 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1988) (held ADEA named plaintiffs who hired counsel need not file separate routine written consent)
Gomez v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 799 F.3d 1192 (8th Cir. 2015) (requires named plaintiff to file separate opt-in form)
Mickles v. Country Club, Inc., 887 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2018) (recognized named plaintiff’s complaint may suffice; opt-ins must give written consent)
Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754 (4th Cir. 2011) (explains named plaintiff’s limitations run from complaint filing; opt-in claim runs from opt-in date)
Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 2008) (distinguishes timing of limitations for named vs. opt-in plaintiffs)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (governs pleading sufficiency standard applied on de novo review)