Peel v. Woods
5:15-cv-00008
E.D. Ky.Mar 17, 2015Background
- Plaintiff Michael E. Peel, a federal inmate housed at a Dismas Charities community correction center in Lexington, KY, filed a pro se submission construed as a Bivens civil-rights complaint.
- Peel alleged Dismas staff (including Michael Woods, Tara Davis, Marita Woods, Sheryl Fisher) confiscated three of his drawings as "pornographic," refused a BP-10 grievance form, threatened him with expulsion, and verbally harassed him.
- He asserted violations of the First Amendment (speech, access to courts, retaliation), Fifth Amendment due process, and Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment) based on verbal harassment; he also described other residents being denied medical care.
- Peel did not specify any particular relief (no demand for damages, injunctive, or declaratory relief) in his pleading—he instead made general requests (a job, a home, reunification with family).
- The Court conducted a preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A and construed Peel’s filings liberally because he is pro se.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to state a demand for relief | Peel described constitutional violations and asked the Court to "hear" his case and generally asked for life improvements; no specific remedies listed | Implicit: absence of a demand fails Rule 8(a)(3) notice requirement and precludes relief | Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice for failing to request specific relief (Rule 8(a)(3)) |
| First Amendment: confiscation, access to courts, retaliation | Peel: drawings improperly seized as "pornography"; defendants denied grievance form and retaliated for complaints, impeding speech/access | Implicit defense: factual disputes and procedural barriers; court emphasized need for concrete relief and standing | Court dismissed these constitutional claims without prejudice (no specific relief sought; only past injuries alleged so no standing for injunctive/declaratory relief) |
| Eighth Amendment: verbal harassment / demeaning treatment | Peel: staff verbally harassed and demeaned him, creating fear among residents | Defendants: verbal harassment alone does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment | Court dismissed these claims with prejudice—verbal harassment not constitutionally actionable |
| Claim for value of confiscated property | Peel seeks redress for loss of drawings | Court: property loss against federal employees must proceed under FTCA or 31 U.S.C. § 3723 and requires administrative exhaustion | Court directed that any property-value claim be pursued under FTCA (after exhausting administrative remedies) rather than Bivens |
Key Cases Cited
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (establishing damages action against federal officers for constitutional violations)
- Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (pro se complaints given liberal construction)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading standards require factual plausibility)
- Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274 (4th Cir. 1985) (courts not required to "conjure up" claims not pleaded by pro se litigants)
- Johnson v. Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2004) (verbal harassment insufficient to state Eighth Amendment claim)
- Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950 (6th Cir. 1987) (same principle on nonactionable verbal abuse)
- Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (standing principles: litigant cannot assert rights of others)
- Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. E. Dayton Tool & Die Co., 14 F.3d 1122 (6th Cir. 1994) (omissions in prayer for relief do not always bar redress, but plaintiffs must plead claims and demand relief)