Pedro Yonatan Hernandez, Jr. v. State
12-14-00297-CR
| Tex. Crim. App. | Sep 2, 2015Background
- Pedro Yonatan Hernandez, Jr. pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child; punishment was tried to a jury.
- At the punishment phase the jury assessed a 50-year sentence; Hernandez appealed.
- On appeal Hernandez raised two issues about voir dire: (1) the trial court improperly limited his questioning about juror bias regarding the range of punishment, and (2) the trial court’s affirmative comments during voir dire improperly endorsed certain juror answers.
- During voir dire defense counsel repeatedly asked whether jurors were "starting off in the hole" or "leaned" toward higher punishment; the State objected as impermissible commitment-type questioning tied to the facts.
- The trial court instructed counsel to focus on whether jurors could be fair and impartial and explained to the panel that they must be able to consider the full range of punishment; the court also engaged the panel and made short approving remarks during that questioning.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed, holding the court’s voir dire directions and remarks did not abuse its discretion or prejudice the defendant.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by restricting defense voir dire on juror bias re: punishment range | Hernandez argued the court improperly curtailed his ability to ask whether jurors "leaned" toward the State or higher punishment; such leaning can show bias subjecting jurors to challenge for cause | The State argued questions tied to specific facts or that sought commitments were impermissible; the court limited questions to whether jurors could be fair and impartial and clarified jurors may "lean" yet still serve | Court held no abuse: judge reasonably focused voir dire on the determinative question of fairness/impartiality and did not prevent discovery of bias that would support a challenge for cause |
| Whether the trial court’s approving comments during voir dire prejudiced the defense | Hernandez argued remarks like "that is perfect" and "that's the right answer" signaled approval of State positions and prejudiced his ability to conduct meaningful voir dire | The State and court explained comments were encouragements to elicit discussion, not endorsements; the court repeatedly told panel its statements were not evidence and there were no wrong answers | Court held no abuse: comments read in context were not reasonably calculated to benefit the State or prejudice Hernandez |
Key Cases Cited
- Dhillon v. State, 138 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. App. 2004) (purposes and breadth of voir dire)
- Zavala v. State, 401 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (broad scope of voir dire to discover bias)
- Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (abuse-of-discretion standard for voir dire rulings)
- Cardenas v. State, 325 S.W.3d 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (jurors must be able to consider entire range of punishment; limits on commitment questions)
- Anderson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App.) (definition and effect of juror bias)
- Clark v. State, 717 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Crim. App.) (excusing jurors unable to be fair despite protestations)
- Ford v. State, 14 S.W.3d 382 (Tex. App. 2000) (trial judge may intervene in voir dire; abuse occurs when comments benefit State or prejudice defendant)
- Gardner v. State, 733 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Crim. App.) (trial judge’s comments may not be reasonably calculated to prejudice defendant)
- Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (definition and limits of commitment questions)
