Pedro Martinez-Chavez v. State, 352 Ga. App. 142

Pedro Martinez‑Chavez (age 29 at the time) pled guilty in 2016 to two counts each of incest, statutory rape, and child molestation for conduct involving his 14–15‑year‑old niece.
As part of a negotiated plea he was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment on one incest count, a consecutive 20 years probation on one statutory rape count, and concurrent probationary terms on the remaining counts.
He moved to correct a void sentence, arguing OCGA § 17‑10‑6.2(b) (2013) required split sentences for sexual offenses; he also moved to withdraw his guilty plea prior to resentencing.
The trial court granted correction as to the incest count (imposing a split of 19 years to serve and the balance on probation), left the statutory rape and other counts as previously ordered, and denied the motion to withdraw the plea.
Martinez‑Chavez appealed, arguing the corrected sentence remained void because split sentences were not imposed on each sexual‑offense count and that, because the sentence(s) were void, he had the right to withdraw his plea before proper resentencing.
The Court of Appeals granted relief, vacating the sentences and the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea, and remanding for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the corrected sentence remained void for failing to impose split sentences on each sexual‑offense count under OCGA § 17‑10‑6.2(b) (2013)	Martinez‑Chavez: Sentences are void because statutory rape and child molestation counts (and the remaining incest count) were not given the required split sentences on each count.	State: Resentencing on the incest count cured the void as to that count; relied on trial court action and later statutory amendments.	The court held the sentences remained void; split sentences were required on each count under the law in effect when the crimes were committed.
Whether Martinez‑Chavez may withdraw his guilty plea as a matter of right before proper resentencing because the sentence was void	Martinez‑Chavez: Because the sentence was void, he had an absolute right to withdraw his plea prior to resentencing.	State: Conceded error as to the incest resentencing but did not prevail in avoiding relief on all counts.	The court held a defendant may withdraw a plea as of right before proper resentencing when the sentence is void; denial of withdrawal was vacated for all counts.
Whether delay in transfer of the record to the Court of Appeals warrants relief	Martinez‑Chavez: Asserted trial court failed to timely transfer the record.	State: Record was ultimately transferred and the Court received it.	The court deemed the timeliness issue moot after receiving and considering the record.

Daniels v. State, 344 Ga. App. 190 (void‑sentence doctrine and correction authority)
State v. Riggs, 301 Ga. 63 (split‑sentence requirement applies to each count under § 17‑10‑6.2(b))
Widner v. State, 280 Ga. 675 (crimes are punished under law in effect when committed)
Hardin v. State, 344 Ga. App. 378 (2017 amendments to § 17‑10‑6.2 not retroactive)
Murray v. State, 314 Ga. App. 240 (right to withdraw plea before resentencing when sentence is void)
Franks v. State, 323 Ga. App. 813 (defendant may withdraw guilty plea as of right before resentencing when sentence is void)