885 F.3d 292
4th Cir.2018Background
- Petitioner Pedro Josue Jimenez-Cedillo, a Mexican national, pled guilty (Feb 2015) to Maryland sexual solicitation of a minor; Maryland law does not require knowledge of the victim’s age for conviction.
- DHS charged removability based on presence without admission and on a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT); Jimenez-Cedillo conceded the first charge and contested the CIMT designation.
- The BIA held the Maryland offense categorically a CIMT despite its lack of a mistake-of-age element, reasoning that offenses against very young victims or with large age gaps may be morally turpitudinous without age-specific scienter.
- Prior BIA/Attorney General precedent (Silva-Trevino I and III, and Silva-Trevino II’s non-disapproval) required some scienter regarding victim age for sexual offenses against minors to qualify as CIMTs.
- The Fourth Circuit found the BIA failed to acknowledge or explain its apparent departure from the prior Silva-Trevino line and thus acted arbitrarily and capriciously; the court granted the petition and remanded for further reasoned explanation and consideration of retroactivity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the BIA properly treats sexual offenses against minors as CIMTs when the statute lacks a mistake-of-age defense | Jimenez-Cedillo: Silva-Trevino required scienter as to victim age; Maryland statute therefore not a CIMT | Gov: No meaningful change from prior BIA rulings; Silva-Trevino III’s footnote reserved statutory-rape exceptions and did not bar the BIA’s approach | Court: BIA changed course from Silva-Trevino line but failed to acknowledge or reasonably explain the change; decision arbitrary and capricious; remand required |
| Whether the BIA provided adequate reasons for abandoning prior precedent on mental culpability as to age | Jimenez-Cedillo: BIA failed to display awareness of change or give good reasons; reliance interests ignored | Gov: Footnote in Silva-Trevino III left room for BIA’s approach; no change to explain | Court: Footnote did not effect a change; BIA must supply a reasoned explanation for altering its position |
| Whether the Maryland offense’s least culpable conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to be a CIMT (alternative argument) | Jimenez-Cedillo: Statute reaches relatively minor conduct (e.g., clothed touching) that may not meet "reprehensible conduct" standard | Gov: Differences in line-drawing are permissible; statute’s age threshold (under 14 with 4-year gap) supports CIMT finding | Court: Did not decide; remanded so BIA may address this argument in first instance |
| Whether any new BIA policy can be applied retroactively to convictions entered under Silva-Trevino I | Jimenez-Cedillo: He relied on Silva-Trevino I when pleading guilty and should not face retroactive change | Gov: (Not resolved below) | Court: Left retroactivity for BIA to consider on remand under traditional retroactivity factors |
Key Cases Cited
- Mohamed v. Holder, 769 F.3d 885 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining moral turpitude requires culpable mental state and reprehensible conduct)
- Sotnikau v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 2017) (describing CIMT elements and scienter requirement)
- Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding adjudicators may consider only the conviction, not underlying conduct)
- Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) (agency must provide reasoned explanation for changes in policy)
- Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (1974) (agency’s path must be reasonably discernible)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (arbitrary and capricious standard for agency action)
- Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (agency inconsistency can indicate arbitrary action)
- SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (court may not supply a reasoned basis for agency action)
- Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015) (aliens’ interest in anticipating immigration consequences of pleas)
- Dalton v. United States, 816 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1987) (remand when agency fails to offer reasoned explanation)
- INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (generally remand to agency for matters primarily within agency expertise)
- ARA Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 71 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 1995) (outlining retroactivity factors)
- Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (retroactivity analysis factors)