Peck v. Peck, 459 P.3d 1033

Kevin and Reggie Peck married (2001), divorced (2003), remarried (2004), and divorced again by stipulation (2010). The second divorce decree directed retirement be divided per Woodward but contained no specific marriage date for division.
Reggie submitted a QDRO in 2016 that used the first marriage date (June 15, 2001) and awarded her 50% of benefits accrued during the marriage; Kevin did not object and the court signed the QDRO.
In October 2017 Kevin moved for a nunc pro tunc correction to change the QDRO date to the 2004 remarriage date, arguing the second decree intended division only for the second marriage; Reggie produced a 2010 QDRO previously approved by Kevin’s prior counsel showing the 2001 date.
The district court found evidence the parties intended the 2001 date, denied nunc pro tunc relief and denied a Rule 60(a) correction (finding no clerical error), then denied a Rule 60(b) motion as untimely, reasoning the claims sounded in mistake/excusable neglect subject to the 90‑day limit.
On appeal the court affirmed that the QDRO date error was a judicial/legal error (not clerical) and so Rule 60(a)/nunc pro tunc relief was not available, but reversed the district court’s timeliness dismissal of the Rule 60(b) motion and remanded for the court to assess whether the facts show mistake/excusable neglect, gross attorney negligence under Rule 60(b)(6), or neither, and whether any Rule 60(b) filing was within a reasonable time.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the QDRO’s use of the first marriage date was a clerical error (nunc pro tunc / Rule 60(a))	Kevin: the date is a clerical mistake; correct to 2004 to reflect the second divorce terms	Reggie: the parties (and prior counsel) intended the 2001 date; not clerical	Held: Error was judicial/legal (substantive), not clerical; nunc pro tunc and Rule 60(a) relief denied and affirmed on appeal
Whether gross attorney negligence can be reviewed under Rule 60(b)(6) and avoid the 90‑day limit	Kevin: alleged gross negligence by prior counsel fits Rule 60(b)(6) (catch‑all) and should not be barred by 90‑day Rule 60(b)(1) limit	District court/Reggie: allegations amount to mistake/excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1), so motion is untimely	Held: Appellate court reversed dismissal — district court made equivocal findings; remand to determine if facts show (b)(1) grounds, gross negligence under (b)(6), or none, and whether filing was within a reasonable time
Whether the district court abused discretion by dismissing the Rule 60(b) motion as untimely	Kevin: district court improperly treated his (b)(6) argument as (b)(1) and applied the 90‑day bar without adequate findings	Reggie: court reasonably found allegations amounted to mistake/excusable neglect	Held: Reversed as to timeliness dismissal because findings were insufficient; remand required for proper analysis

State v. Rodrigues, 218 P.3d 610 (Utah 2009) (distinguishes clerical errors from judicial errors)
Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah 2006) (Rule 60(b)(6) inapplicable if grounds fall within another subsection; gross attorney negligence may fit (b)(6) if exceptional)
In re Kiley, 427 P.3d 1165 (Utah 2018) (defines QDRO as mechanism to effectuate a decree's retirement division)
Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830 (Utah 1987) (QDRO instructs plan trustee how to distribute benefits)
Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984) (error classification depends on whether error was in rendering or recording judgment)
Fisher v. Bybee, 104 P.3d 1198 (Utah 2004) (limits on using Rule 60(b) to attack legal errors)
Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 770 P.2d 125 (Utah 1989) (district courts can generally correct clerical but not judicial errors)
Crane-Jenkins v. Mikarose, LLC, 374 P.3d 1024 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (discusses "reasonable time" standard for Rule 60(b) motions)