181 A.3d 931
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2018Background
- Barnett sued multiple correctional officers in Baltimore City (including Peay) for injuries sustained in 2006; process and notices were mailed to DPSCS and to Peay’s home address.
- A private process server executed an affidavit that on Dec. 25, 2008 he left the summons/complaint with Peay’s "sister and co-resident" (Donna Dingle) at Peay’s Owings Mills apartment; Peay did not answer.
- Court entered an order of default (July 1, 2009) and a default judgment for $500,000 in August 2009; notices were mailed to Peay’s address.
- No action by Peay until garnishment of wages in 2015 and a motion to set aside the default judgment in March 2016, asserting Dingle was not a resident and thus service was invalid.
- The circuit court found service defective (Dingle not a resident) but denied relief under Md. Rule 2-535(b) because Peay had not acted with diligence or good faith in bringing the motion; Peay appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Barnett) | Defendant's Argument (Peay) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defective abode service (papers left with sister who was not a resident) constitutes a "mistake" under Md. Rule 2-535(b) | Service was adequate as return of service and mailed notices suffice | Service on a non-resident houseguest is improper; lack of valid service means no personal jurisdiction | A jurisdictional defect in service can be a "mistake" under Rule 2-535(b) (i.e., a jurisdictional mistake) |
| Whether the court may deny relief under Rule 2-535(b) based solely on lack of diligence/good faith when a judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction | Court may consider plaintiff's reliance and defendant's delay to preserve finality | Diligence/good faith requirement does not apply to jurisdictional mistakes that render judgment void | The court erred: diligence/good faith test does not apply to jurisdictional mistakes; a void judgment must be set aside unless jurisdiction was waived |
| Whether a defaulting defendant can waive the right to challenge personal jurisdiction by conduct/inaction | Plaintiff argued facts (mailings, long delay) support waiver | Defendant contended she did not receive proper service and thus did not waive the defense | Court must determine on remand whether Peay waived the right to object (apply waiver-by-conduct test) |
| Standard for determining waiver by conduct (when service appears facially proper) | Plaintiff argues apparent compliance and subsequent notices support finality | Defendant emphasizes absence of proper residence-based service and lack of receipt | The appellate court directed the trial court to assess waiver using a multi-factor approach (good-faith effort to serve; actual notice; prejudice to plaintiff) |
Key Cases Cited
- Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456 U.S. 694 (U.S. 1982) (defendant may default and later collaterally attack judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction)
- Little v. Miller, 220 Md. 309 (Md. 1959) (lack of personal service cannot be cured merely by a defendant's knowledge of the suit; judgment obtained without personal service may be set aside)
- Chapman v. Kamara, 356 Md. 426 (Md. 1999) ("mistake" under Rule 2-535(b) limited to jurisdictional mistakes)
- Miles v. Hamilton, 269 Md. 708 (Md. 1973) (defect in service can render judgment void and subject to revision)
- Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nefflen, 436 Md. 300 (Md. 2013) (explaining Maryland’s two-step default process and limits on revisory power)