Pearlie Jackson v. Washtenaw Cnty.
678 F. App'x 302
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Deputies Urban and Mercure approached Stanley Jackson during a drug investigation; Jackson fled into his mother’s house and kept his hand near his waistband.
- Urban pursued, warned Jackson he would tase him, and deployed a Taser in probe mode (Taser No. 1); Jackson fell and initially was rigid and unresponsive.
- Deputies attempted to handcuff Jackson; he later moved, pulled his hands away, and deputies used three additional tasings (Nos. 2–4) and Farmer punched Jackson to prevent an alleged bite.
- Paramedics transported Jackson to a hospital; he remained agitated, received 2 mg lorazepam, went limp shortly thereafter, and died; autopsy listed cardiac arrest from ischemic heart disease with adrenergic stress and noted Taser as a potential contributor.
- Plaintiff (Jackson’s mother / estate) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force (Fourth/Fourteenth Amendments) and advanced state-law claims; district court granted summary judgment to officers on qualified immunity grounds and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
- Sixth Circuit majority affirmed qualified immunity, concluding no genuine dispute that officers reasonably perceived active resistance justifying each Taser use; a dissent would have reversed and remanded, finding material factual disputes about whether resistance was taser-induced.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers used constitutionally excessive force in tasing and striking Jackson | Jackson was incapacitated or convulsing from prior Taser shocks and therefore any subsequent tasings/punch were excessive | Officers reasonably perceived active resistance, imminent threat, and were justified in subsequent tasings/punch to subdue and handcuff him | Majority: No excessive force established; qualified immunity applies |
| Whether Jackson was "actively resisting" (vs. passive/taser-induced movements) | Movements after initial tasing were involuntary or medical distress, creating a factual dispute | Movements were voluntary resistance to avoid handcuffing and posed officer safety concerns | Majority: Reasonable officer could conclude Jackson was actively resisting; no genuine dispute in record |
| Whether the right to be free from repeated tasings of a subdued person was clearly established | Precedent supports that using force on incapacitated/subdued persons is excessive; officers should have known repeated tasings violated rights | Given split-second judgments and facts suggesting risk (drug activity, hand at waistband, continued struggle), right was not clearly established in this context | Majority: Right not clearly established as to these facts; qualified immunity protects officers |
| Whether federal court should retain supplemental state-law claims after dismissal of §1983 claim | Plaintiff sought to proceed on state claims | Defendants urged dismissal if federal claims fail | Court: District court appropriately declined supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing federal claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective-reasonableness standard for excessive force)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity standard)
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (qualified immunity—whether action could reasonably be thought consistent with rights)
- Goodwin v. City of Painesville, 781 F.3d 314 (6th Cir. 2015) (Taser-induced convulsions can be passive resistance; repeated force thereafter may be unlawful)
- Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2015) (physical struggle to prevent handcuffing can constitute active resistance)
- Hagans v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff's Office, 695 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2012) (qualified immunity inquiries and context-specific reasonableness)
- Austin v. Redford Twp. Police Dep’t, 690 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2012) (prior tasings/other force may render suspect too disoriented to be actively resisting)
- Shreve v. Jessamine Cty. Fiscal Court, 453 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2006) (force against incapacitated person can be excessive)
- Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2002) (using force after suspect incapacitated by mace was excessive)