Peake v. Commonwealth
132 A.3d 506
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2015Background
- Pennsylvania's Older Adults Protective Services Act (Act) (35 P.S. §§10225.101–.5102) was amended in 1996–1998 to require criminal-history checks for employees of covered facilities and to disqualify persons convicted of enumerated offenses from employment; some offenses triggered a lifetime ban.
- A 1997 amendment broadened the lifetime ban to cover numerous offenses (from murder and sexual offenses to certain theft and misdemeanor offenses) and included a grandfathering rule for employees who had at least one year of continuous employment at a covered facility as of July 1, 1998.
- Petitioners (five individuals with remote convictions and one employer, Resources for Human Development) challenged the lifetime ban as facially and as-applied unconstitutional under Article I, §1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution; they sought declaratory and injunctive relief and moved for summary relief.
- Petitioners relied on post-enactment social science and EEOC guidance showing recidivism declines over time and arguing individualized assessment is feasible; they also invoked prior decisions (Nixon I/II) holding similar provisions unconstitutional as applied and identifying the irrational grandfathering distinction.
- The Commonwealth defended the statute (and argued Petitioners face factual disputes) and relied on an unbinding Department of Aging Interim Policy that permits case-by-case hiring and a five-year dependent-care work pathway, asserting it alleviated Petitioners’ claims.
- The Commonwealth Court concluded the Act’s lifetime employment ban (Section 503(a)) is facially unconstitutional (and unconstitutional as applied to the named petitioners), overruled preliminary objections, and enjoined enforcement of the lifetime ban.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Act’s lifetime employment ban is facially unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution | Ban is overbroad and irrational (grandfathering creates arbitrary class and many applications violate due process); irrebuttable presumption of unfitness; many applications are unconstitutional | Facial challenge fails because statute could be valid in some applications; factual disputes exist; agency Interim Policy mitigates harm | Held: Facial challenge succeeds under the "plainly legitimate sweep" test—a substantial number of applications are invalid; ban is unconstitutional on its face |
| Whether the lifetime ban creates an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption | Ban irrebuttably presumes unfitness regardless of time since conviction, rehabilitation, crime severity; reasonable alternatives (individualized risk assessments) exist | Commonwealth did not defend the irrebuttable-presumption aspect substantively | Held: Irrebuttable presumption violates due process per Clayton/J.B.; statutory presumption is not universally true and alternatives exist |
| Whether Nixon I/II and related precedent control as-applied relief for petitioners | Petitioners' convictions are remote; Nixon decisions show similar provisions invalid as applied; they should be allowed to seek covered employment | Commonwealth says Interim Policy provides pathway and factual disputes preclude summary relief | Held: As-applied relief granted for petitioners; Nixon decisions dispositive; Interim Policy is nonbinding and cannot cure statutory invalidity |
| Proper standard for facial challenge (no-set-of-circumstances vs. plainly legitimate sweep) | Petitioners adopt the plainly legitimate sweep (substantial invalid applications) standard | Commonwealth urged no-set-of-circumstances test from federal Salerno | Held: Court applies Pennsylvania precedent (Clifton/Ickes) and uses plainly legitimate sweep standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Nixon v. Commonwealth, 789 A.2d 376 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (as-applied challenge to Act’s criminal-history provisions)
- Nixon v. Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277 (Pa. 2003) (Supreme Court reversed on rational-basis ground; found grandfathering irrational)
- Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1957) (Pennsylvania rational-basis/substantive due process standard for occupational regulation)
- Department of Transportation v. Clayton, 684 A.2d 1060 (Pa. 1996) (irrebuttable presumption doctrine and due-process limitations)
- In the Interest of J.B., 107 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014) (rejection of irrebuttable presumption in juvenile sex-offender registration; individualized risk assessment available)
- Warren County Human Servs. v. State Civil Serv. Comm’n (Roberts), 844 A.2d 70 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (invalidating lifetime ban that foreclosed consideration of rehabilitation/time)
- Johnson v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 59 A.3d 10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (lifetime ban in Public School Code held unreasonable and beyond necessities)
- Clifton v. Allegheny County, 969 A.2d 1197 (Pa. 2009) (adopting the "plainly legitimate sweep" standard for facial challenges)
- Commonwealth v. Ickes, 873 A.2d 698 (Pa. 2005) (reaffirming state court approach to facial challenges and overbreadth)