Peacock v. Waldeck
2016 IL App (2d) 151043
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- On Oct. 6, 2011, Peacock’s car was struck in the rear by a vehicle driven by Kathleen Waldeck while both were in the same lane on Roosevelt Road; Peacock alleged she was stopped at a red light and there were no visual obstructions.
- Waldeck later died (death unrelated to the accident); Barton Waldeck was appointed special representative for her estate.
- Waldeck’s answer admitted she was behind Peacock, admitted her car struck Peacock’s rear, and admitted she had an unobstructed view, but averred lack of knowledge about whether Peacock’s car was stopped at the light.
- No other eyewitnesses were known; plaintiff would have been the only witness to certain details now potentially barred by the Dead-Man’s Act.
- The special representative moved for summary judgment, arguing Peacock could not create a triable issue of negligence without testimony barred by the Dead-Man’s Act; the trial court granted summary judgment for the estate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiff can defeat summary judgment on negligence based on her own testimony that she was stopped at a red light | Peacock: her testimony (that car was stopped) creates inference of rear-driver negligence and raises triable issue | Estate: plaintiff’s testimony about events in decedent’s presence would be barred by the Dead‑Man’s Act, so no admissible evidence proves negligence | Affirmed: summary judgment proper; admissible admissions do not establish negligence as a matter of law |
| Whether defendant’s admissions (rear impact; unobstructed view; following) suffice to infer negligence | Peacock: defendant’s admissions allow an inference of negligence (like Burns) | Estate: admissions alone leave other non-negligent explanations plausible (abrupt stop, road/vehicle conditions) | Held: admissions alone insufficient to permit a jury verdict; speculation cannot substitute for proof |
| Whether defendant’s averment of lack of knowledge about red light has evidentiary weight | Peacock: at oral argument she sought to rely on defendant’s lack of knowledge to permit inference plaintiff was stopped | Estate: lack of knowledge is not an admission and has no evidentiary significance | Held: lack of knowledge has no probative value; cannot substitute for decedent testimony barred by Dead‑Man’s Act |
| Whether Rerack and Burns compel denial of summary judgment here | Peacock: analogies to Rerack/Burns support denying summary judgment (circumstantial proof of stop/negligence) | Estate: factual record here lacks the corroborating circumstantial proof available in those cases | Held: Rerack/Burns distinguishable; here evidence leaves only conjecture, so summary judgment appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32 (2004) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Koziol v. Hayden, 309 Ill. App. 3d 472 (1999) (summary judgment where pleadings/affidavits would require directed verdict)
- Rerack v. Lally, 241 Ill. App. 3d 692 (1992) (Dead‑Man’s Act does not bar testimony about matters not occurring in decedent’s presence)
- Balma v. Henry, 404 Ill. App. 3d 233 (2010) (purpose and scope of Dead‑Man’s Act)
- Burns v. Grezeka, 155 Ill. App. 3d 294 (1987) (rear‑end collision into a stopped vehicle can raise a prima facie case of negligence)
- Thomas v. Northington, 134 Ill. App. 3d 141 (1985) (abrupt or unsafe stop by lead vehicle is a possible nonnegligent cause of rear‑end collision)
- Fabschitz v. King, 10 Ill. App. 3d 43 (1973) (road conditions as a possible cause of collision)