Pe Paul Goromou v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., 721 F.3d 569

Background

Goromou, Guinea citizen, admitted to the U.S. in Dec 2005 as a nonimmigrant official to train with the Coast Guard; training ended/dismissed May 2006, and he remained in the U.S. beyond July 19, 2006.
He filed initial asylum application Jan 3, 2007, cured a deficiency and refiled Jan 16, 2007; DHS referred the case to an IJ and later initiated removal proceedings with an NTA on July 10, 2008.
Goromou claimed past persecution and feared future persecution due to ethnicity, religion, and political opinion; he alleged a 1996 torture by gendarmes and a 2006 blacklist from Guinea.
IJ May 6, 2010 held that Goromou did not establish asylum eligibility within the one-year deadline or under changed/extraordinary circumstances; granted withholding of removal but not asylum.
BIA May 30, 2012 affirmed the IJ, concluding no reasonable filing time after discovering changed/extraordinary circumstances and no extraordinary circumstances; remanded for DHS investigations.
IJ Oct 1, 2012 reaffirmed withholding of removal and denied asylum; Goromou sought review in the Eighth Circuit, which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over untimeliness ruling.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether BIA properly analyzed changed vs extraordinary circumstances	Goromou argues BIA conflated the two standards and should review whether delay after changing circumstances was reasonable.	Goromou's delay is unreasonably long under both independent analyses; BIA properly reviewed each separately.	BIA did not conflate; independent analyses supported denial.
Whether the November 2006 letter was a material change affecting eligibility	Goromou contends the November letter materially increased fear and should affect eligibility and timeliness.	BIA treated the letter as not material beyond corroborating credibility, and materiality was properly grounded in the earlier change.	Court held materiality is a discretionary, reviewable legal question; however, the BIA’s materiality conclusion was upheld as a legal determination within its discretion.
Whether the court may review the materiality decision under REAL ID Act	Goromou asserts §1252(a)(2)(D) permits review of legal questions about materiality.	BIA’s materiality judgment is a discretionary decision insulated from review.	Court concluded materiality is reviewable as a legal question and remandable for proper analysis.
Whether Goromou filed within a reasonable period after changed/extraordinary circumstances	Goromou filed within a reasonable time after learning of changed circumstances (spring 2006) and the November 2006 letter.	Delay after discovery of changed circumstances and after the November letter was not reasonable.	Held not reasonable; no timely filing excused by changed or extraordinary circumstances.
Whether the court has jurisdiction to review the asylum untimeliness ruling	Goromou seeks review of BIA's untimeliness decision as a legal question under REAL ID Act.	§1158(a)(3) generally bars review, but §1252(a)(2)(D) allows review of constitutional or legal questions.	Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to review untimeliness ruling, but noted review of legal questions could be possible in other contexts.

Key Cases Cited

Purwantono v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2007) (REAL ID Act scope for constitutional/legal review)
Gutierrez-Vidal v. Holder, 709 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2013) (reviewing IJ/BIA decisions as final agency action)
Ignatova v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 2005) (discretionary nature of materiality/changed circumstances)
Abraham v. Holder, 647 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2011) (materiality standard; evidence review in asylum context)
Khan v. Filip, 554 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2009) (review limits under §1252(a)(2)(D))
Munoz-Yepez v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 347 (7th Cir. 2006) (statutory interpretation of changed/extraordinary circumstances)
Restrepo v. Holder, 610 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2010) (limits of judicial review of factual determinations)