(PC) Blake v. Allison
2:23-cv-00208
| E.D. Cal. | Sep 29, 2023Background
- Pro se state prisoner Kenyata Blake filed a § 1983 suit alleging exposure to contaminated drinking and bathing water at Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP), claiming dizziness, joint pain, and fatigue.
- Blake sues multiple supervisory officials (Allison, Kernan, Covello, Lizarraga, Bettencourt, Ahmed, Larrabee), alleging sewer/storm-drain failures, corroded pipes, and a failure to construct a required water-treatment plant.
- Blake alleges Lizarraga authorized use of chemicals to treat contamination, which Blake claims damaged boilers and did not resolve the problem.
- The complaint relies in part on findings, fines, settlements, and agency testing showing contamination in waterways surrounding MCSP, and prior worker illnesses during construction.
- Procedurally, Blake’s IFP application was granted; the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and concluded it failed to state a claim. Leave to amend was granted; motions for appointment of counsel and class certification were denied; the docket was amended to remove Charles Stevenson as a plaintiff.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| IFP / filing fee | Blake is indigent and seeks IFP. | N/A (statutory process). | IFP granted; initial partial fee ordered and monthly payments required. |
| Personal involvement / supervisory liability | Supervisors knew of contamination by virtue of positions and failed to act. | Naming supervisors by title is insufficient; no specific acts or causal link alleged. | Dismissed as to supervisors for failure to allege personal involvement or causal connection. |
| Conditions of confinement (Eighth Amendment) | Drinking/bathing water is contaminated; officials were deliberately indifferent to health risks. | Allegations are speculative; odor alone and surrounding-water contamination do not establish unsafe prison water or deliberate indifference. | Dismissed for failure to plead objective harm and defendants’ deliberate indifference. Leave to amend allowed. |
| Equal protection | Blake alleges unequal treatment (implicitly vs. others). | Prisoners are not a protected class; no facts showing disparate treatment of similarly situated persons. | Dismissed for failure to state an equal protection claim. |
| Appointment of counsel | Indigent, limited legal knowledge, complex issues, limited library access; counsel requested. | No exceptional circumstances shown; complaint fails to state a claim so no likelihood of success. | Denied. |
| Class certification | Seeks class treatment for similarly situated inmates. | A pro se incarcerated plaintiff cannot adequately represent a class or appear on behalf of others. | Denied; action construed as individual suit. |
| Co‑plaintiff removal | Move to remove Charles Stevenson for failure to prosecute. | Stevenson never properly joined; complaint signed only by Blake and only Blake filed IFP application. | Clerk directed to update docket to remove Stevenson as plaintiff; motion otherwise moot. |
Key Cases Cited
- Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989) (frivolous-claim standard)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must contain more than labels and conclusions)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (facial plausibility standard)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard)
- Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998) (personal involvement requirement under § 1983)
- Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1982) (conclusory allegations insufficient)
- Twombly/Iqbal framework applied in screening: Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rule 12(b)(6) standard in § 1915A screening)
- Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (court cannot require counsel to represent indigent civil litigants)
- Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2009) (factors for appointing counsel in § 1983 suits)
- Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (pleading must show how conduct caused constitutional deprivation)
