Payton v. Commonwealth
2010 Ky. LEXIS 298
Ky.2010Background
- Sharon Payton consented to a search of the marital residence after the officers explained their purpose and Sharon invited them in.
- Deputy Blanton asked to look around before Sharon said 'come on in,' with substantial evidence supporting that she granted consent prior to entry into the home.
- During the search, drugs and paraphernalia were found in the master bedroom, leading Payton to file a motion to suppress.
- Trial court found Sharon had unrestricted, apparent authority to consent; Payton’s challenged perceptions were deemed non-preclusive.
- Court of Appeals affirmed; Payton challenged Randolph and voluntariness, but the Kentucky Supreme Court agreed the suppression denial was correct under the record.
- Justice Schroder concurred in part and dissented in part, particularly regarding the bedroom search and Randolph implications.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sharon validly consented to search | Payton contends Sharon lacked valid consent to search. | Commonwealth argues Sharon had authority and consent was voluntary. | Yes, Sharon validly consented; search upheld. |
| Whether the trial court correctly applied law to the consent facts | Randolph should control, making co-occupant consent ineffective if objected by Payton. | Consent was determined by objective standard; Sharon’s consent was valid and effective for Payton. | Lower courts correctly applied law; Sharon’s consent valid under totality of circumstances. |
| Whether Sharon's consent was voluntary under the totality of circumstances | Consent was coerced by threats to custody of children and intimidation. | Totality of circumstances did not show coercive police conduct; consent was voluntary. | Consent voluntary; no reversible error in denying suppression. |
| Whether Randolph forecloses relief since Payton did not clearly revoke consent | Randolph precludes applying co-occupant consent when present occupant refuses. | Randolph distinguished; Payton did not unequivocally revoke Sharon's consent or object clearly. | Randolph not controlling under these facts; Payton did not revoke/oppose consent. |
Key Cases Cited
- Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (U.S. 2006) (physical co-occupant's opposing consent defeats warrantless search as to him)
- Jimeno v. United States, 500 U.S. 248 (U.S. 1991) (objective reasonableness of consent scope; containers within car encompass drugs)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973) (voluntariness of consent evaluated by totality of circumstances)
- Cook v. Commonwealth, 826 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1992) (intoxication may not automatically negate voluntary consent; objective focus)
- Commonwealth v. Fox, 48 S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2001) (scope and voluntariness of consent under Kentucky law)
- Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920 (Ky. App. 2002) (standard for reviewing suppression rulings; factual findings require substantial evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Krause, 206 S.W.3d 922 (Ky. 2006) (factors in evaluating voluntariness of consent; police conduct and context)
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (U.S. 1968) (false assertion of warrant can invalidate consent to search)
- United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1984) (co-occupant consent issues and control over residence)