Paysun Long v. Randy Pfister
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 20611
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Paysun Long was tried twice for the 2001 murder of Larriec Sherman; key evidence was four eyewitness identifications (two recanted before trial; two—Keyonna Edwards and Brooklyn Irby—testified in court).
- Irby had previously told a prosecutor’s investigator (Frank Walter) that she had been coerced and had recanted; at the second trial she testified in accordance with her earlier recorded statement and denied telling Walter she had been coerced.
- The defense called Walter, who testified that Irby had indeed recanted and said she had been coerced; prosecutors did not rebut Walter on cross or during closing and did not affirmatively tell the jury that Irby had lied at trial.
- A state appellate court acknowledged error but found it harmless; Long’s federal habeas petition was reversed by a Seventh Circuit panel under Napue/Giglio, which held prosecutors must correct known false testimony immediately.
- The en banc Seventh Circuit majority held AEDPA §2254(d) bars relief because the Supreme Court has not "clearly established" that Napue/Giglio apply in circumstances where (a) the defense elicited the false testimony, (b) the defense knew the truth, (c) the prosecutor did not rely on the falsehood, or (d) contradictory evidence was presented before deliberations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Long) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Napue/Giglio require prosecutors to correct false testimony elicited by defense counsel | Napue/Giglio require correction of any known false testimony regardless who elicited it | These decisions do not clearly establish that prophylactic correction is required when defense elicited the falsehood | Held: Not clearly established by Supreme Court precedent for AEDPA purposes; relief barred under §2254(d) |
| Whether prosecutor must correct false testimony when defense already knows the truth | Long: Duty to correct is independent of defense knowledge; jurors must not be left with uncorrected perjury | State: If defense knows truth or elicits contradictory evidence, Napue/Brady principles do not necessarily require prosecutor correction | Held: Supreme Court has not clearly decided that defense knowledge eliminates prosecutor’s Napue duty; AEDPA deference prevents relief |
| Whether Constitution forbids conviction when prosecutor neither corrects nor relies on the falsehood | Long: Constitutional violation exists whenever prosecution allows known perjury to stand | State: No clear Supreme Court rule requires reversal where prosecutor does not rely on the falsehood and jury heard contrary evidence | Held: Not clearly established that omission (without reliance) requires reversal under Napue/Giglio for AEDPA relief |
| Whether presentation of contradictory evidence before deliberation cures Napue error | Long: Contradictory testimony (Walter) did not cure the harm because prosecution never admitted witness lied | State: Presentation of contradictory evidence and jury assessment can cure any harm; not clearly established otherwise | Held: Supreme Court law does not clearly establish that contradictory in‑court evidence eliminates Napue/Giglio concerns; AEDPA bars relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecutor must correct testimony known to be false; conviction obtained through use of false evidence violates due process)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (Brady/Napue principles apply when prosecution knowingly allows false testimony or fails to disclose agreements affecting witness credibility)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose materially exculpatory evidence to defendant)
- Agurs v. Illinois, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (Brady disclosure requirement limited to evidence unknown to the defense)
- Trombetta v. California, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (summarizing Napue principle about prosecutorial obligation regarding false testimony)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference applies even when state court opinion does not discuss federal precedent)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (standard for harmless error on collateral review)
- United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 1995) (circuit precedent holding no Napue violation where defense knew the truth and elicited the false testimony)