Payne v. Brown, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22650

Payne pled guilty to four felonies for forcibly detaining and raping a 17-year-old; charges involving a 13-year-old were dismissed.
The state court sentenced Payne to 50 years, with some counts concurrent and a withheld sentence on the criminal-confinement charge.
The plea agreement was not reduced to writing, and Payne claimed his lawyer advised a maximum of 20 years.
The prosecutor had pledged not to recommend a sentence, but that pledge was broken, leading to resentencing.
Payne challenged the representation in state court; the Indiana appellate court affirmed for a different prejudice rationale.
In the federal §2254 proceeding, the district court denied relief; the Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo under §2254(d).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was counsel ineffective for plea and sentencing advice?	Payne asserts deficient performance and prejudice under Hill.	Brown contends any error did not prejudice Payne under Strickland/Hill.	State court breach deemed contrary, but relief denied after full analysis.
Did lack of a written plea agreement prejudice Payne?	No written contract; misperception about maximum serves harmed Payne.	On-record terms satisfied; no prejudice from absence of writing.	No prejudice; terms were stated on the record and understood by Payne.
Did misstatement about sentencing range establish prejudice?	Incorrect advice about maximum could have changed the decision to plead guilty.	Judge corrected information; Saunders understanding supported by in-court dialogue.	No prejudice; Payne knew potential penalties from the judge's statements.
Did the prosecutor's breached pledge affect outcome?	Breach undermines fairness and could have altered the plea.	Plea terms were fulfilled on record; resentencing preserved justice.	No prejudice; resentencing did not worsen the outcome due to prosecutorial influence.
Does Hill v. Lockhart govern the prejudice inquiry here?	Hill requires showing that but-for counsel error, Payne would have insisted on a trial.	Indiana procedure and record-mart of statements could negate prejudice.	Hill governs; however, ultimate relief denied after full Strickland/Hill analysis.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (prejudice from guilty-plea counsel when pleading)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (deficient performance and prejudice framework)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (clarified prejudice standard post-Fretwell)
Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001) (reaffirmed Hill prejudice in plea context)
Fretwell v. Collins, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (special prejudice narrative; limits foundational change)
Wyatt v. United States, 574 F.3d 455 (2009) ( promissory inquiry to elicit defendant's narrative in allocution)
Hutchings v. United States, 618 F.3d 693 (2010) (open-court statements control later inconsistency)