Pauline Burkhart v. R.J.Reynolds Tobacco Company
884 F.3d 1068
| 11th Cir. | 2018Background
- This is an Engle-progeny case: Pauline Burkhart sued R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris, and Lorillard for negligence, strict products liability, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy, alleging smoking caused her COPD. Trial (bifurcated) lasted 10 days; jury found for Burkhart and awarded $5 million compensatory and punitive damages totaling $2.5 million (apportioned among defendants).
- The district court instructed the jury to give preclusive effect to the Engle Phase I findings on defendants’ conduct (as permitted by Florida Supreme Court precedent) but required jurors to decide individualized issues (class membership, causation, reliance, and punitive-damage mens rea).
- During trial Burkhart suffered a brief in-court medical incident; defendants moved for mistrial which the court denied after individually questioning jurors.
- Defendants objected to jury instructions on statute of limitations (court added addiction/causation language), to the court’s interventions during defendants’ closing on punitive-damage issues, and to the court’s delivery of an Allen charge after jury deadlock on punitive damages.
- Post-verdict, defendants sought reduction of compensatory award for comparative fault and raised federal preemption and due-process arguments about giving Engle findings preclusive effect; the district court denied relief and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Statute of limitations instruction | Burkhart: limitations begins when manifestations put claimant on notice of disease causation; jury should decide timing | Defendants: court’s instruction (adding addiction/causation wording) misstated Florida law and prejudiced defenses | Instruction was erroneous but harmless because evidence showed COPD diagnosis post-1990 and no reasonable jury could find earlier notice |
| Mistrial based on Burkhart’s in-court medical event | Burkhart: event was brief; jurors could follow instructions to ignore it | Defendants: event provoked sympathy and irreparably prejudiced them requiring mistrial | District court did not abuse discretion; jurors individually assured impartiality and instruction cured any prejudice |
| Court interventions in defendants’ closing and punitive-damage standard | Burkhart: Engle findings establish conduct; court needed to keep jurors focused on punitive mens rea standard | Defendants: court improperly curtailed defense and implied punitive liability already established | Court acted within discretion to clarify distinction between preclusive Engle findings (conduct) and heightened punitive standard (actual knowledge by clear and convincing evidence); no abuse |
| Allen charge coercion | Burkhart: needed jury consensus on punitive amount | Defendants: Allen charge (and earlier instructions) were coercive given short deliberations and pressured jurors to surrender honest beliefs | Charge not inherently coercive under totality; initial non-coercive instruction then pattern Allen charge was permissible; no reversal |
| Comparative-fault reduction of compensatory award | Burkhart: comparative fault applies only to negligence/strict liability, not to intentional torts; jury form separated issues | Defendants: jury expected reduction; plaintiff waived right to avoid apportionment by inviting comparative-fault assessment | Florida Supreme Court precedent (Schoeff) controls: intentional-tort exception applies; no reduction and no waiver found |
| Federal preemption and due process limit on Engle findings | Burkhart: Engle Phase I findings are preclusive on conduct elements; plaintiff may still litigate individualized elements | Defendants: federal law preempts state tort claims; due process prohibits preclusive use of Engle findings for concealment/conspiracy | Preemption claim foreclosed by Graham; due process challenge rejected — defendants had full and fair opportunity in Engle and appellate process; giving preclusive effect does not violate due process |
Key Cases Cited
- Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (Phase I jury findings on common issues retained and given preclusive effect for later individual suits)
- Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 2013) (clarified scope of preclusive effect of Engle Phase I findings; conduct elements conclusively established where they match tort elements)
- Walker v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 734 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2013) (held giving Engle Phase I findings preclusive effect does not violate due process)
- Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 857 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (reaffirmed preclusion of Engle findings as to negligence and strict liability under due process analysis)
- Schoeff v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 232 So. 3d 294 (Fla. 2017) (held comparative-fault statute does not apply where jury finds intentional torts; rejected waiver theory based on plaintiff’s trial representations)
- Frazier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 89 So. 3d 937 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (discussed when creeping disease manifestations provide notice sufficient to start limitations period)