Paula Casillas v. Madison Avenue Associates, Inc
926 F.3d 329
| 7th Cir. | 2019Background
- Madison Avenue Associates sent Paula Casillas a debt-collection letter under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) that omitted that disputes and requests for original-creditor information must be made "in writing."
- Casillas filed a putative class action seeking statutory damages and fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k for the disclosure omission; she did not allege she tried or intended to dispute or verify the debt.
- The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing after this court’s precedential decision in Groshek (applying Spokeo).
- The Seventh Circuit panel affirmed: a bare procedural omission that caused no concrete harm or appreciable risk to the plaintiff does not satisfy injury-in-fact.
- The court declined to follow contrary authority (notably Macy in the Sixth Circuit) and rejected Casillas’s informational-injury and Havens-analogue arguments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Casillas has Article III standing for §1692g(a)(4)–(5) omission | Omission of the writing requirement is a statutory violation that itself creates concrete injury (informational injury) | Omission is a bare procedural violation that caused no harm or appreciable risk to Casillas | No standing; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether a bare failure to disclose statutory procedural requirements can alone confer standing | Deprivation of information is a concrete injury under Akins/Public Citizen/Havens | Spokeo requires a concrete, particularized injury or appreciable risk to plaintiff herself; mere statutory violation insufficient | Deprivation of information here is not a cognizable Article III injury absent harm or risk to plaintiff |
| Whether Robertson/Groshek line supports standing for procedural disclosure violations | Relies on Robertson for lost-opportunity theory | Groshek and Spokeo limit such theories where no risk to plaintiff is alleged | Court distinguishes Robertson; finds Groshek controls and bars standing here |
| Whether Sixth Circuit’s Macy decision is controlling/ persuasive | Macy: omission creates materially greater risk to consumers and thus concrete injury | Seventh Circuit: Macy conflicts with Spokeo/Groshek because Macy did not require risk to the plaintiffs themselves | Court declines to follow Macy; holds Macy inconsistent with Seventh Circuit precedent and Spokeo |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (Article III requires a concrete, particularized injury beyond a bare statutory violation)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury-in-fact that is concrete and particularized, traceable, and redressable)
- Groshek v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 865 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2017) (procedural disclosure violations insufficient for standing absent concrete harm or appreciable risk)
- Robertson v. Allied Solutions, 902 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2018) (lost opportunity to review substantive information can constitute concrete injury)
- Macy v. GC Services Ltd. Partnership, 897 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding omission of in-writing requirement under §1692g can create a materially greater risk of harm and confer standing)
- Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (denial of information that statute requires to be public can itself be a concrete injury)
- Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) (denial of requested government records under disclosure statutes can constitute concrete injury)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (statutory right to truthful information may be a legally cognizable injury when tied to the statute’s protected interest)
