Paula Bennett v. Shawn Brewer, 940 F.3d 279

Background

Paula Bennett (age 18) was convicted of aiding and abetting first‑degree murder after she pointed out the victim to her boyfriend Kyron Benson and drove the getaway car; Benson shot and killed Stephanie McClure. Bennett received life without parole.
At trial an eyewitness (Larvaidan) placed Benson as the shooter; multiple witnesses testified about Benson’s threats, though most said they did not find the threats credible; Bennett reported the theft to police the day before and was emotionally distraught after the shooting.
Bennett’s trial counsel focused on arguing Benson’s innocence rather than separating Bennett’s mental state from Benson’s conduct; counsel did not call any defense witnesses, did not impeach Breanna Kandler (a witness who endorsed Benson’s threats), and did not present evidence of intimate‑partner abuse (Battered Woman’s Syndrome).
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Bennett’s conviction; Judge Shapiro dissented, arguing trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective and that conflicts with Benson’s defense warranted a Ginther hearing.
On collateral review, state trial and appellate courts applied Strickland and rejected Bennett’s ineffective‑assistance claims (finding lack of prejudice). Bennett sought federal habeas relief; the district court denied the petition and an evidentiary hearing, and granted a certificate of appealability.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying AEDPA deference: it concluded the state court reasonably applied Strickland and that appellate‑counsel claims could not excuse procedural default because the underlying trial‑counsel claims lacked merit.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for tying Bennett’s defense to Benson’s innocence and failing to challenge Bennett’s mens rea	Bennett: counsel’s strategy linked her fate to Benson, failed to attack key credibility issues, and neglected to present abuse evidence — prejudicing the outcome	Warden: overwhelming evidence supported inference Bennett knew Benson’s intent (her actions at scene, driving getaway); counsel’s errors were not likely to change the verdict	State courts reasonably applied Strickland; no reasonable probability of a different outcome; claim denied under AEDPA
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Breanna Kandler	Bennett: Kandler had prior inconsistent statements undermining her claim that Benson’s threats were credible; impeachment would undercut intent inference	Warden: even without Kandler, other evidence (threats, Bennett pointing out victim, driving away) supported knowledge of intent	No prejudice shown; omission did not create substantial likelihood of a different verdict
Whether counsel erred by failing to present evidence of intimate‑partner abuse (Battered Woman’s Syndrome)	Bennett: abuse evidence would explain her behavior and state of mind, undermining mens rea	Warden: duress is not a defense to first‑degree murder under Michigan law; jurors might view abuse as corroborating awareness of dangerousness	Trial court reasonably found that admission of such evidence was unlikely to produce a substantially different result
Whether appellate counsel’s failure to raise trial‑counsel claims excuses procedural default or independently warrants relief	Bennett: appellate counsel’s omission was deficient and prejudicial, so it supplies cause to overcome procedural default; alternatively, appellate ineffectiveness should be reviewed de novo	Warden: appellate counsel not ineffective because the omitted claims were meritless; state court substantively rejected underlying claims so AEDPA remains applicable	Appellate‑counsel claim fails: state court substantively rejected trial‑counsel claims, so appellate omission was not objectively unreasonable; Johnson presumption unrebutted; no relief

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part standard for ineffective assistance: performance and prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA review: state court’s application of Strickland must be objectively unreasonable)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (distinguishes unreasonable application from incorrect application under AEDPA)
Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289 (2013) (presumption that a state‑court decision rejecting a federal claim was on the merits; limited exceptions)
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997) (federal courts may reach merits despite procedural issues for judicial economy)
McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2004) (ineffective appellate counsel can excuse procedural default only if omitted claims were likely to succeed)
Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1999) (failure to raise a meritless claim is not ineffective assistance)
Jackson v. Bradshaw, 681 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2012) (consider totality of evidence when assessing Strickland prejudice)
People v. Bennett, 802 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (state appellate decision affirming conviction; Shapiro, J., dissented on counsel effectiveness)
People v. Ginther, 212 N.W.2d 922 (Mich. 1973) (state practice of evidentiary hearing on ineffective‑assistance claims)