Paula Babb v. Maryville Anesthesiologists, P.C., 942 F.3d 308

Background

Paula Babb, a CRNA, was hired by Maryville Anesthesiologists in June 2015; colleagues raised concerns about her eyesight after she reported a degenerative retinal condition.
Maryville physicians met with Babb on Oct. 30, 2015, asked her to see an ophthalmologist, and discussed possible legal consultation; Babb complied with an eye exam in December.
Separate events (an alleged “fracture table” incident in October and intraoperative "twitches" in a January robotic case) were reported to Maryville physician-owners and were discussed alongside eyesight concerns.
On January 13, 2016, Maryville voted to terminate Babb, citing two clinical errors; a contemporaneous, group-wide e-mail (sent by a CRNA at the direction of a physician-owner) attributed the firing largely to Babb’s worsening eyesight.
Babb produced expert testimony (Jennifer Hultz, CRNA) opining that Babb’s conduct met the applicable standard of care; the district court excluded Hultz entirely and granted summary judgment for Maryville on the ground that Maryville honestly believed the clinical errors justified termination.
The Sixth Circuit reversed: it held the district court abused its discretion by excluding Hultz in full, clarified the post-ADAAA "regarded as" legal standard, and found genuine disputes of material fact as to both perceived disability and pretext.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of expert testimony (Hultz)	Hultz is a qualified CRNA whose standard-of-care opinions are relevant to whether the clinical errors occurred and thus to pretext.	Hultz improperly attacks witness credibility and tells the jury what result to reach on pretext/ultimate legal issue.	Court: District court abused discretion by excluding Hultz in toto; admissible portions addressing standard of care and reasonableness are relevant (remand to consider admissible portions).
Whether Maryville "regarded" Babb as disabled under the ADA (post‑ADAAA)	Maryville’s requests for an eye exam, internal comments (asking about disability insurance), evaluations, and meeting discussions show Maryville perceived a physiological impairment (vision).	Maryville contends no perceived disability; at most requested a fitness-for-duty exam which is not per se "regarded as."	Court: A genuine factual dispute exists that Maryville regarded Babb as having a physical impairment under the ADAAA (Sutton requirement no longer applicable).
Whether Maryville’s stated reasons (clinical errors) were pretext for disability discrimination	Expert opinion and contemporaneous Aycocke e-mail (sent at physician’s direction) create issues whether errors were serious and whether vision, not clinical errors, motivated termination.	Maryville invokes the "honest belief" rule: it reasonably and honestly relied on particularized facts showing dangerous clinical errors.	Court: Genuine disputes exist on both reasonableness of relying on the clinical-error rationale and whether the errors actually motivated termination; summary judgment was improper.
Proper legal standard for "regarded as" ADA claims after ADA Amendments Act	Plaintiff: ADAAA broadened "regarded as" protection; no requirement to show perceived impairment substantially limited a major life activity.	Defendant relied on pre‑ADAAA Sutton framework.	Court: Clarifies that post‑2008 ADAAA eliminated Sutton’s substantial‑limitation requirement; only transitory and minor impairments are excluded.

Key Cases Cited

Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 826 F.3d 885 (6th Cir. 2016) (standard of review for summary judgment and employment‑law principles)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993) (framework for admissibility of expert testimony)
In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2008) (Fed. R. Evid. 702 inquiries and admissibility guidance)
Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994) (distinction between factual expert opinion and impermissible legal conclusions)
Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 243 F.3d 255 (6th Cir. 2001) (abuse‑of‑discretion review for exclusion of experts)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial employment discrimination)
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1999) (pre‑ADAAA perceived‑disability standard overturned by ADAAA)
Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2009) ("honest belief" rule explained)
Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting and applying honest‑belief principle)
Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 360 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2004) (statements by non‑decisionmakers or unrelated decisionmakers generally insufficient to show discriminatory animus)