917 F.3d 618
8th Cir.2019Background
- Paul Voss, a maintenance supervisor at the Magnolia Housing Authority for ~14 years, tested positive on a February 2014 drug screen for opiates; he provided a hydrocodone prescription afterward.
- Supervisor Richard Wyse suspended Voss without pay when Voss initially refused to explain his opiate use; the Housing Authority later reinstated pay and maintained benefits during the suspension.
- Housing Authority asked Voss for a doctor’s letter describing prescription use and any side effects relevant to job safety; Voss returned to work May 14 and was told he could not operate Authority vehicles/equipment until clearance was provided.
- Voss resigned May 19, 2014, citing a retaliatory work environment, then filed EEOC charges alleging disability discrimination and retaliation and later sued in federal court asserting ADA claims, Title VII claims, and procedural due process claims.
- The district court dismissed many claims, allowed limited claims to proceed, then granted summary judgment for defendants on remaining ADA discrimination, procedural due process, and Title VII retaliation claims; Voss’s Rule 59(e) motion was denied.
- On appeal the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding Voss failed to exhaust some claims, failed to make a prima facie ADA regarded-as-disability claim, and had no protectable property interest under Arkansas law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exhaustion of administrative remedies for constructive discharge/other adverse acts | Voss says his amended EEOC charge described ongoing retaliation that constituted constructive discharge | Defendants say EEOC charge only alleged suspension/threat of discharge and did not include the post-test restrictions or duties-revocation | Claim for constructive discharge and other post-test acts not exhausted; those claims dismissed |
| ADA "regarded-as" discrimination | Voss contends employer regarded him as disabled based on positive drug test and restrictions after return | Housing Authority says any concern was about medication safety/effects, not a perceived disability; suspension ended before Wyse knew of any disability | No prima facie case: Voss cannot show adverse action taken because he was regarded as disabled; summary judgment affirmed |
| Adverse employment action sufficiency | Voss argues suspension and post-return restrictions were adverse actions leading to constructive discharge | Defendants assert suspension was paid/temporary and restrictions were minor (no pay/benefit loss); many acts not raised with EEOC | Suspension and restrictions not sufficiently adverse (and many not exhausted); claims fail |
| Procedural due process — property interest in employment | Voss points to personnel/operating policies (equal opportunity; suspension policy) to claim a property interest in continued employment | Defendants urge Arkansas at-will rule; manuals contain no express for-cause termination provision and suspension policy was honored (paid) | No property interest under Arkansas law; due process claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (summary judgment and admissible-evidence standards)
- Sellers v. Deere & Co., 791 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2015) (EEOC exhaustion requirement; separate acts must be charged)
- Parker v. Crete Carrier Corp., 839 F.3d 717 (8th Cir. 2016) (regarded-as-disability framework and McDonnell Douglas application)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Sup. Ct.) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Bennett v. Watters, 260 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2001) (property-interest analysis for public-employee due process claims)