Paul v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 701 F.3d 514

Dana Paul, a Kaiser radiology CT technologist since 1997, suffered back injuries requiring multiple surgeries, after which she believed she could not safely perform certain duties.
In 2009 Kaiser merged CT and Radiology duties into a single CT/Rad Technologist role, eliminating her former position and requiring heavier duties with patient handling.
Paul requested an accommodation in February 2009, seeking to avoid certain duties or to have assistance, and Kaiser engaged in an interactive discussion but denied a full shift-change accommodation.
Kaiser created a temporary accommodation by proposing a day-shift assignment and weekend-duty exemptions, but the union reportedly denied changes that would infringe other employees’ seniority rights.
By August 2009 Kaiser informed Paul the accommodation had failed and placed her on unpaid status, inviting her to apply for other roles; her physician urged continued capability with assistance when needed.
Paul pursued remedies under the CBA but did not submit her grievance to arbitration; she then filed a state-law disability-discrimination and retaliation claim in 2010, which Kaiser removed to federal court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether removal was proper as complete preemption.	Paul argues state claims do not arise under the CBA and require no CBA interpretation.	Kaiser contends LMRA §301 preempts, as resolution hinges on CBA terms.	Remand proper; complete preemption not established.
Whether Smolarek controls preemption here.	Smolarek supports not preempting when rights arise under state law and CBA is not invoked in complaint.	Kaiser asserts Smolarek is distinguishable or not controlling.	Smolarek controls to show no complete preemption.
Whether the claim is 'inextricably intertwined' with CBA terms.	Discrimination claim rests on external state-law rights, not CBA interpretation.	Discipline or accommodation relates to scheduling and seniority under CBA, entwining with CBA terms.	Not inextricably intertwined; tangentially related CBA terms insufficient for preemption.
Whether the district court properly denied remand and awarded judgment on the pleadings.	Remand should have been granted; no preemption and PPJ error in granting judgment.	Removal proper; judgment on pleadings appropriate for failure to arbitrate under CBA.	Remand reversed; judgment on pleadings vacated for lack of jurisdiction.
Whether attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) should be awarded.	Fees should be awarded for improper removal.	Removal was reasonably based; fees denied.	Fees denied.

Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326 (6th Cir. 1989) (state-law claims not subject to complete preemption when CBA relief is not pursued)
Kitzmann v. Local 619-M Graphic Communications Conference, 415 F. App’x 714 (6th Cir. 2011) (two-step preemption test under §301)
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (§301 preemption; rights created by labor contracts; analysis of contract terms)
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (well-pleaded complaint rule for federal-question jurisdiction; preemption framework)
DeCoe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 1994) (look to essence of claim; not strictly bound by well-pleaded complaint; interrelation with CBA terms)
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (uniform interpretation of CBAs; if state claim depends on CBA meaning, preemption may apply)
Mattis v. Massman, 355 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2004) (distinguishes when rights are established by CBA vs. external state-law regime)
Klepsky v. United Parcel Serv., 489 F.3d 264 (6th Cir. 2007) (preemption hinges on whether claim seeks reinstatement or is framed as CBA remedy)
Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1990) (CBA terms as defense alone does not trigger preemption)