Paul v. I-Force, L.L.C.
2017 Ohio 5496
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Paul (claimant) filed an employer-initiated appeal of an Industrial Commission allowance (original action Case No. 08 CV 266); she voluntarily dismissed that complaint in June 2012 and timely refiled in June 2013 under R.C. 2305.19 (the savings statute).
- The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation admitted the allowed conditions; I-Force (employer) answered and disputed Paul’s right to participate for RSD. The case later sat idle.
- The trial court issued a notice of impending dismissal for lack of prosecution and dismissed the action on March 9, 2015; a May 1, 2015 journal entry clarified the dismissal as without prejudice.
- In July 2016 I-Force moved for judgment on the pleadings arguing Paul was barred from refiling by the “double-dismissal” rule because Paul had previously dismissed and the court had since dismissed the refiled action.
- The trial court denied I-Force’s motion, reasoning the double-dismissal rule (Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a)) did not apply because the March 2015 dismissal was involuntary under Civ.R. 41(B). I-Force appealed.
- The appellate court reversed: it rejected application of the double-dismissal rule but held Paul could not use the savings statute more than once, so I-Force was entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court should have granted judgment on the pleadings based on the double-dismissal rule | Paul argued the double-dismissal rule did not apply because the second dismissal (for lack of prosecution) was involuntary and thus not an adjudication under Civ.R. 41(A) | I-Force argued the two prior dismissals (Paul’s voluntary dismissal and the later dismissal) barred refiling under the double-dismissal rule of Civ.R. 41(A)(1) | Court: Double-dismissal rule did not apply because the second dismissal was under Civ.R. 41(B), not a unilateral Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) notice dismissal |
| Whether Paul was nonetheless precluded from refiling under the savings statute (R.C. 2305.19) | Paul argued she timely refiled and sought leave to refile outside time if needed; procedural objections asserted to I-Force’s motion | I-Force argued the savings statute can be used only once and Paul already used it when she refiled in 2013; the March 2015 dismissal ended her ability to refile | Court: Held R.C. 2305.19 may be used only once; because Paul already refiled once, she could not refile again and employer was entitled to judgment on the pleadings |
| Whether the trial court’s denial of I-Force’s motion made Paul’s motion to refile moot and whether she could seek relief under Civ.R. 60(B) | Paul contended the trial court should have considered her post-judgment relief motion (Civ.R. 60(B)) instead of deeming it moot | I-Force did not pursue this cross-issue on appeal | Court: Appellate court declined to consider Paul’s arguments changing the judgment because she did not cross-appeal; remanded so the trial court may consider any post-judgment motion on rehearing |
Key Cases Cited
- Olynyk v. Scoles, 868 N.E.2d 254 (Ohio 2007) (double-dismissal rule applies only to two unilateral Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) notices)
- Robinson v. B.O.C. Group, Gen. Motors Corp., 691 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio 1998) (in employer appeals the claimant’s pleading is treated as a complaint for Civ.R. 41 purposes; employer’s notice of appeal remains pending despite claimant dismissal)
- Fowee v. Wesley Hall, Inc., 844 N.E.2d 1193 (Ohio 2006) (if claimant fails to refile within one year under R.C. 2305.19 in an employer-initiated appeal, employer is entitled to judgment on the appeal)
- Kaiser v. Ameritemps, Inc., 704 N.E.2d 1212 (Ohio 1999) (voluntary dismissal of claimant’s complaint does not affect employer’s pending notice of appeal)
- Thomas v. Freeman, 680 N.E.2d 997 (Ohio 1997) (the savings statute may only be used once)
- Thorton v. Montville Plastics & Rubber, Inc., 902 N.E.2d 482 (Ohio 2009) (statutory amendment requires employer consent for claimant to voluntarily dismiss in employer-initiated appeals)