Paul v. Blackburn Ltd. Partnership
63 A.3d 1107
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2013Background
- Country Place Apartments pool fenced with a six-foot barrier and gates that could be opened; Berkshire managed fence maintenance; CPS operated the pool under a management agreement.
- In June 2010, three-year-old Christopher nearly drowned at the Country Place pool; his mother Alicia Daley Paul sued for negligence and medical expenses.
- The pool area was open during certain hours; the pool rules warned of risk and required passes for entry; a prior incident suggested the gate was not fully secure.
- Plaintiff alleged the pool barrier did not comply with statutory/regulatory barriers and that defendants breached contractual duties to maintain a safe common area.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting Christopher was a trespasser with only a duty to avoid willful or wanton conduct; the circuit court granted summary judgment, ruling Christopher was a trespasser and that no statutory duty applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether COMAR 10.17.01.21 applies to Country Place pool | Paul argues the 1997 barrier standards apply and that grandfathering does not exempt violations. | Blackburn/Berkshire contend regulations grandfathered; pre-1997 pool not required to meet new barrier standards. | COMAR 10.17.01.21 applies; grandfathering did not exempt the pool from barrier standards. |
| Whether statutory/regulatory duties create a duty of care and whether violations are evidence of negligence | Paul asserts statutory/regulatory duties exist and violations suffice to establish negligence per se or as evidence. | Defendants argue no duty arises for a trespasser and statutes/regulations do not create liability unless a common-law duty exists. | Statutes/regulations can create a standard of care and violations may constitute evidence of negligence regardless of trespasser status. |
| Whether the pool owners owed proximate causation in light of circumstantial evidence | Meager circumstantial evidence could show how Christopher accessed the pool area and caused injuries. | Defendants contend causation cannot be proven without direct evidence of entry. | Circumstantial evidence supports a reasonable inference that Christopher accessed the pool by squeezing through the gate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70 (Md. 2003) (statutory duty evidence when designed to protect a class including plaintiff)
- Joseph v. Bozzuto Mgmt. Co., 918 A.2d 1230 (Md. 2007) (violation of statute may be evidence of negligence; need not prove actual notice)
- Allen v. Dackman, 991 A.2d 1216 (Md. 2010) (housing/code duty to occupants can apply even if trespassers)
- Bell v. Page, 156 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1967) (ordinance duty to protect children may override common-law trespasser status)
- Rivers v. Hagner Mgmt. Corp., 959 A.2d 110 (Md. App. 2009) (violation evidence not dependent on knowledge of violation)
- Dow v. L&R Props., Inc., 796 A.2d 139 (Md. App. 2002) (causation may be proved circumstantially)
- Lyon v. Campbell, 707 A.2d 850 (Md. App. 1998) (circumstantial evidence sufficient for causation)