Paul Mendel v. City of Gibraltar
727 F.3d 565
| 6th Cir. | 2013Background
- Mendel, a police dispatcher for the City of Gibraltar, was terminated and sued for FMLA interference; district court granted summary judgment that the City employed fewer than 50 employees for FMLA purposes.
- The City’s so-called volunteer firefighters worked without set shifts, maintained other employment, and were paid $15 per hour for responding to calls or maintaining equipment.
- Volunteer firefighters typically trained on their own time without compensation and were issued Form-1099 MISC; they lacked health or other employment benefits, though the City kept personnel records and could promote or discharge them.
- At issue is whether these volunteer firefighters are “employees” under the FLSA (for purposes of FMLA eligibility) or volunteers excluded from employee status.
- The majority held that the firefighters are employees under the FLSA and FMLA because their hourly wages constitute compensation rather than a nominal fee, reversing the district court.
- The court endorsed a broad, case-by-case economic-realities test under the FLSA and rejected the district court’s reliance on § 203(y) as controlling for the general employee/volunteer determination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are Gibraltar's volunteer firefighters employees under the FLSA/FMLA? | Mendel argues firefighters are employees due to compensation and control. | City contends volunteers are not employees for FMLA purposes. | Firefighters are employees; wages are compensation. |
| Does the FLSA volunteer exception apply by making wages nominal rather than compensation? | Wages could be nominal; some hours and training are not compensated, supporting volunteer status. | Wages are substantial and tied to response time, not nominal. | Wages are compensation, not nominal fees. |
| What is the relevance of 29 U.S.C. § 203(y) to the broader employee/volunteer question? | § 203(y) should be considered in determining overtime treatment for fire protection activities. | § 203(y) is narrow and does not govern the general employee/volunteer status for FLSA. | § 203(y) is not applicable to the general employee determination in this case. |
Key Cases Cited
- Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (economic reality test; broad interpretation of 'employee')
- Tony & Susan Alamo Found., v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (work in contemplation of compensation governs employee status)
- Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947) (FLSA's broad definition of 'employee' and breadth of coverage)
- Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947) (employment relationship determined by whole activity)
- Donovan v. Brandel, 786 F.2d 1114 (1984) (case-by-case analysis of employment status under FLSA)
- Arban v. West Pub. Corp., 345 F.3d 390 (2003) (FMLA eligibility framework; entitlement vs. retaliation theories)
- Purdham v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 637 F.3d 421 (2011) (nominal fee analysis for compensation vs. nominal payments)
- Krause v. Cherry Hill Fire Dist. 13, 969 F. Supp. 270 (1997) (distinguishes nominal fee from compensation for firefighters)