Paul Massey v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 149 So. 3d 780

In 1994 Paul Massey committed felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile and attempted molestation; the crimes were not reported until 2004 and he was convicted in February 2007.
At the time of the crimes (1994) La. Rev. Stat. § 15:571.3 (Act 138) made inmates generally eligible for "good time" credits for good behavior and programming.
In 2006 the Legislature amended § 15:571.3 (Act 572), narrowing eligibility and excluding convictions for certain juvenile-sex offenses; Act 572 stated it applied to convictions on or after August 15, 2006.
The Department computed Massey’s sentence under Act 572 after his 2007 conviction, revoking previously credited good time and moving his release date from 2011 (or earlier) to 2018.
Massey exhausted administrative remedies and litigated; lower tribunals upheld the Department’s application of Act 572, relying on State ex rel. Olivieri; the Louisiana Supreme Court granted review.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held the retroactive application of Act 572 increased Massey’s punishment by eliminating good‑time eligibility and therefore violated the federal and state Ex Post Facto Clauses; the Court ordered recomputation under Act 138.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether applying Act 572 retroactively to Massey’s 1994 offenses violates the Ex Post Facto Clause	Massey: rescission of good‑time eligibility increases punishment and prolongs incarceration, so retroactive application is unconstitutional	Department: Act 572 applies because conviction occurred after the statute’s effective date; it does not increase the statutory punishment for the offenses	Held: Retroactive application of Act 572 increased the measure/terms of punishment (practical prolongation of incarceration) and violated Ex Post Facto; sentence must be recalculated under Act 138
Whether Olivieri controls or permits retroactive application here	Massey: Olivieri does not authorize retroactive denial of good time where it increases punishment	Department/Lower courts: cited Olivieri to support applying the newer statute	Held: Olivieri is distinguishable; federal and state precedents (Weaver, Lynce, Morales, etc.) require that denying previously available good‑time credits retroactively violates Ex Post Facto

California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (U.S. 1995) (clarifies ex post facto framework post‑Collins and limits language from earlier cases)
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (U.S. 1981) (retroactive reduction/elimination of good‑time credits increases punishment and violates Ex Post Facto)
Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 438 (U.S. 1997) (retroactive elimination of conduct‑dependent credits violates Ex Post Facto)
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (U.S. 2013) (ex post facto inquiry focuses on whether change creates significant risk of increased punishment)
Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (U.S. 2000) (test is whether retroactive change creates a significant risk of prolonging incarceration)
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (U.S. 1990) (refined ex post facto analysis to focus on changes that alter criminal definition or increase punishment)
State v. Singleton, 688 So.2d 486 (La. 1997) (Louisiana precedent holding retroactive denial of good‑time credits violates Ex Post Facto)
State ex rel. Bickman v. Dees, 367 So.2d 283 (La. 1979) (retroactive changes to good‑time computation can violate Ex Post Facto)
State v. Curtis, 363 So.2d 1375 (La. 1978) (similar holding on retroactive reductions in good‑time benefits)
State v. Hyde, 968 So.2d 726 (La. 2007) (penalty is determined by law in effect at time of offense)