PAUL KAMIENSKI VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENTOF TREASURY(L-2106-10, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), 169 A.3d 493

Background

Kamienski was convicted (jury) of two murders and a cocaine-conspiracy charge in 1988; murder convictions later vacated on habeas by the Third Circuit and he was released after >20 years; the drug-conspiracy conviction remained intact and resulted in a consecutive sentence.
He sued the State under New Jersey's Mistaken Imprisonment Act (N.J.S.A. 52:4C-1 to -7) seeking ~ $5.9M in damages and $1M in fees; the complaint used income-based damages derived from his pre-incarceration earnings.
The State moved to dismiss, arguing statutory ineligibility because Kamienski still had a valid conviction (drug conspiracy) and challenging whether the habeas ruling satisfied the Act’s clear-and-convincing proof requirement that he “did not commit the crime.”
The trial court granted summary judgment for Kamienski, awarded damages (~$343,000) and $90,230 in attorney fees limited to the civil claim; the State appealed and Kamienski cross-appealed on damages/fee scope.
The Appellate Division considered (1) eligibility under N.J.S.A. 52:4C-6 when other convictions remain, (2) whether a habeas order finding insufficient evidence equals the Act’s required clear-and-convincing proof of factual innocence, (3) correct damages computation under the pre-2013 statute, and (4) the scope of recoverable "reasonable attorney fees."

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Eligibility under N.J.S.A. 52:4C-6 when other convictions remain	Kamienski: Section 6 does not bar him because the statute disqualifies only persons serving another term or who served concurrently; consecutive valid sentence should not defeat his claim	State: Legislature intended to limit relief to truly innocent persons; an intact unrelated conviction (here drug conspiracy) renders him ineligible	Court: Section 6 does not bar him; disqualifiers are limited to serving another term or concurrent sentences, so surviving consecutive conviction does not automatically preclude a claim
Whether habeas relief (vacatur for insufficient evidence) satisfies N.J.S.A. 52:4C-3(b) clear-and-convincing proof that claimant "did not commit the crime"	Kamienski: Third Circuit's habeas grant (insufficient evidence) shows he did not commit the murders and thus meets the Act’s standard	State: A habeas ruling that evidence was insufficient (legal innocence) is not the same as a judicial finding of actual innocence required by the Act	Court: Habeas reversal for insufficiency is not equivalent to clear-and-convincing proof of factual innocence; summary judgment was improper on that basis and remand is required
Damages calculation under pre-2013 Act (twice prior income v. $20,000 per year)	Kamienski: Statute should be read to allow twice prior income for each year incarcerated (i.e., multiply prior income by years) yielding a much larger award	State: Damages cap is the greater of (A) twice prior-year income or (B) $20,000 per year — two alternative ceilings, not cumulative or per-year income multiple	Court: Adopted last-antecedent and legislative-history analysis; the pre-2013 statute provided two alternative caps — award is the greater of (1) twice prior income or (2) $20,000×years — thus trial court’s per-year $20,000 approach was correct if that exceeded the income-based cap
Scope of "reasonable attorney fees" recoverable under the Act	Kamienski: Fees should include defense fees from the criminal trial, appeals, habeas, and civil claim to fully compensate wrongful incarceration costs	State: "Reasonable attorney fees" means fees incurred prosecuting the civil compensation claim only; criminal-defense fees are not part of subsection (b)	Court: "Reasonable attorney fees" are limited to fees related to the civil compensation litigation; criminal-defense fees are not recoverable under the Act’s pre-2013 language

Key Cases Cited

State v. Kamienski, 254 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div.) (prior state appellate decision in Kamienski prosecution)
D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232 (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo; legislative intent guide)
Parsons ex rel. Parsons v. Mullica Twp. Bd. of Educ., 226 N.J. 297 (use of legislative history when statute ambiguous)
In re Passaic Cty. Utils. Auth., 164 N.J. 270 (plain language controls absent ambiguity)
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (defines clear-and-convincing standard and its societal function)
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (reliance on distinctions between legal and factual findings in other civil contexts)
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321 (examples of civil proceedings applying heightened proof standards)
Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22 (clear-and-convincing standard application guidance)
Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469 (summary-judgment standard; view evidence for non-movant)
Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (summary-judgment legal standard)
Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581 (appellate review of legal issues; no deference)
Mills v. N.J. Dep't of the Treas., 435 N.J. Super. 69 (characterizing the Act as remedial and a waiver of sovereign immunity)