Paul Glen Everett v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3027

Everett, a Florida inmate, challenged his first-degree murder conviction and death sentence in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, after the district court denied relief but granted a COA on two issues.
Florida officers interviewed Everett after his Miranda invocation, later obtaining DNA consent in Alabama and serving an arrest warrant in Florida, leading to disputed statements and DNA evidence at trial.
The state court admitted Everett’s November 27 confession and DNA evidence; suppression was denied, and trial proceeded with guilt and penalty phases culminating in a death sentence.
Everett’s penalty-phase counsel, Walter Smith, conducted mitigation investigations in 2002, including interviews with family members, records requests, and a psychiatric evaluation, but the defense theory evolved as Everett gave multiple versions of Bailey’s death.
Everett challenged on post-conviction review that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate mitigation and that Dr. Mhatre’s testimony could have changed the outcome; the 3.851 court and Florida Supreme Court denied relief, applying Strickland and AEDPA standards.
The federal district court denied relief, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding no unreasonable application of federal law or unreasonable factual determinations under AEDPA.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Fifth Amendment: DNA consent after invoking counsel	Everett argues interrogation or coercive pressure followed his invocation of counsel, rendering DNA consent invalid.	The Florida Supreme Court correctly held the DNA consent request not interrogation and not testimonial.	No Fifth Amendment violation; DNA request not interrogation.
Fifth Amendment: November 27 confession after arrest warrant	Everett claims the November 27 confession was the product of improper interrogation after invoking counsel.	Everett initiated the contact and knowingly waived his rights; statements were voluntary.	Confession admissible; no violation.
Ineffective assistance of counsel in penalty phase	Smith failed to conduct a thorough mitigation investigation and unreasonably relied on Everett’s father; Dr. Mhatre’s testimony could have altered the balance of aggravation and mitigation.	Smith reasonably investigated mitigation, consulted Dr. Rowan, and presented substantial mitigating evidence; additional evidence would not have changed outcome.	No deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland as applied by AEDPA.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (necessity of warnings for custodial interrogation)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (bright-line rule: once counsel is requested, interrogation must cease unless initiated by accused)
In re Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (U.S. 1980) (interrogation includes functional equivalents; police should not elicit incriminating responses)
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (U.S. 1988) (police may have routine contact without counsel; escalation to interrogation requires counsel presence)
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (U.S. 1975) (scrupulously honoring right to silence; reinitiation after a break must respect rights)
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (U.S. 1966) (testimony and physical evidence exceptions; DNA/samples not inherently testimonial)
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (U.S. 1988) (testimonial privilege covers communications; not all compelled acts are testimonial)
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (U.S. 2005) (requires reasonable investigation before sentencing; not binding here but informs standard)
Belmontes v. California, 558 U.S. 15 (U.S. 2010) (postconviction evidence must be weighed against aggravation and can be cumulative)