Paul A. Dyer v. Superintendent of Insurance
2013 ME 61
| Me. | 2013Background
- Paul A. Dyer, a long‑time licensed insurance producer and consultant, sold a $39,326.50 single‑premium immediate annuity (SPIA) to a 72‑year‑old client in 2005; the SPIA produced fixed monthly payments that resulted in a net loss to the client over five years. Dyer’s firm earned $1,350 commission on the transaction.
- Dyer testified he sought to implement a multi‑part plan (including gifting and Medicaid planning) and claimed the SPIA diversified risk and guaranteed income; the Superintendent found Dyer misstated yield and failed to explain terms to the client.
- After the client complained, Dyer filed a Bureau complaint against the insurer (Old Mutual); during the ensuing investigation he provided disorganized document “dumps,” failed to timely answer questions, and claimed a voicemail promising a refund that the Superintendent found not credible.
- The Bureau sought enforcement; the Superintendent found violations of multiple provisions of the Maine Insurance Code (including incompetence/untrustworthiness and record/cooperation failures), revoked Dyer’s licenses, imposed $5,500 in civil penalties, and ordered $1,350 restitution (the commission amount).
- The Business & Consumer Docket affirmed but vacated certain findings (notably an undefined §2152 unfair‑practice finding and one record‑keeping finding) and remanded for specification; on remand the Superintendent struck §2152 references but reinstated the same penalties; the court again affirmed, and Dyer appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court.
Issues
| Issue | Dyer's Argument | Superintendent's / State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Superintendent’s factual findings and credibility determinations were unsupported by the record | Dyer argued the client’s testimony was unreliable (poor memory) and some findings lacked substantial evidence | Superintendent relied on corroborating documents, Dyer’s own testimony, and the factfinder’s credibility determinations | Court deferred to the Superintendent; credibility and factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and not disturbed |
| Whether reinstating identical penalties on remand (after striking §2152 findings) was an abuse of discretion | Dyer argued that removal of §2152 findings undermined the basis for the original penalties and required reassessment | Superintendent explained penalties rested on the nature and character of eleven independent wrongful acts (e.g., incompetence, deception, failure to cooperate), statutory penalties were within limits | Court held penalties were lawful, within statutory bounds, and not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether revocation was arbitrary and capricious or inconsistent with other disciplinary decisions | Dyer asserted the sanction was unduly harsh and inconsistent with similar cases | Superintendent showed consideration of facts and statutory authority to revoke for incompetence/untrustworthiness | Court rejected arbitrary/capricious claim; decline to review inter‑case consistency beyond record; revocation was reasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Superintendent of Ins., 60 A.3d 1272 (Me. 2013) (standard of review for Superintendent decisions on appeal)
- Anthem Health Plans of Me., Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 40 A.3d 380 (Me. 2012) (deference to agency interpretation of technical statutes)
- Gulick v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 452 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1982) (deference to agency factual findings)
- Wood v. Superintendent of Ins., 638 A.2d 67 (Me. 1994) (license revocation appropriate for failures showing lack of good personal or business reputation)
- Pettinelli v. Yost, 930 A.2d 1074 (Me. 2007) (abuse of discretion review framework)